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The Jean Monnet Chair
The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision of the Academic 
Council of the European University Institute, with the financial support of 
the European Community. The aim of this initiative was to promote studies 
and discussion on the problems, internal and external, of European Union 
following the S ingle European Act, by associating renowned academics and 
personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and 
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This paper presents the need of a European agenda for East Asia. The 
root of East Asian dynamism lies in an actively pursued export-oriented 
development strategy. The consequences embrace new opportunities as 
well as risks. Security issues have been replaced by economic develop­
ment at the core of the international agenda, and the categorization of a 
first, a second and a third world has become outmoded.
East Asian dynamism spurs influences towards protectionism as well as 
liberalization. The United States is giving up its position as champion of 
free trade and there is a fear of growing non-tariff barriers and domestic 
trade barriers in developed countries. On the other hand, there has been a 
demonstration of super-gains from trade. Previously planned economies 
open up and seek a change of their systems, and there are strong tenden­
cies towards regional integration, particularly in the EC.
The underexploited economic relationship between the EC and East Asia 
is very much at the core of which way the world economy is to go. The 
Japanese and other East Asians are now taking major steps to increase 
their activities in Europe, while the Europeans are preoccupied with their 
own restructuring. There is a great need of a European policy vis-à-vis 
East Asia which can serve as a pillar in a future liberal trade and invest­






















































































































































































1. Introduction: A New World
The last decades have seen sweeping changes in our economic and social 
landscape. The first world, the industrialized and market-oriented econ­
omies of the west, has lost its dominant position. The second world, i.e. 
the state planned socialist economies, has virtually ceased to exist as we 
know it. The third world of developing countries, finally, has split in sub­
categories which display very divergent economic trends. While Latin 
America and Africa are lagging behind, the phenomenal dynamism of 
East Asia stands out as a remarkable and continuing success story. Japan 
has, of course, already been transformed not only to a leading industrial­
ized economy, but to an eminent power in services and finance as well. A 
number of countries in the region are now about to follow suit.
These conspicuous developments are the result of a long process, the 
impact of which has merely become visible during the 1980s. The turbu­
lent changes in different regions have had repercussions on each other. 
For example, Asian Pacific dynamism has made a lagging Soviet Union 
more exposed to unfavourable comparisons. More significantly, a set of 
successful economic policies provided an alternative model to those 
wanting to develop and grow. A dynamic Far East, and not just a growing 
West, further undermined the relative strength of the economic base pro­
vided by the old Soviet system for military security.
The United States and the Soviet Union used to assume special roles on 
the basis of their military might. The United States has further strength­
ened its muscle in the last decades, which has contributed to forcing the 
Soviet Union to reappraise its policies. At the same time, both these pow­
ers have lost in importance due to domestic social and economic weak­
nesses as well as an intensified pursuit of economic goals rather than ideo­
logical struggles across the world. Centrifugal forces are now turning the 
Soviet Union into a source of destabilization for itself and others. Mean­
while, the previously undisputed leadership of the U.S. has been reduced 
by the country’s inability to ‘keep its own house in order’ and to correct 
its deficits, combined with the unavoidable relative decline as other 
economies grow.
The first world encounters the ongoing challenge of adjusting to East 
Asian competition and the new opportunities arising there. As a result, the 
West is no longer the undisputed champion of free trade and capital 
movements. In particular, the international trade policy of the U.S. has 
become less constructive and more quarrelsome. ‘Super 301’ and ‘Regular 
301 ’ have emerged as powerful bilateral instruments to by-pass the Gen­
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This trend towards new 
protectionist policies is followed by a number of other developed coun­
tries.
Broadly speaking, national size in itself seems less an advantage as a 
basis for growth at the present time. While ‘bigness’ can effectively be 




























































































the social or economic one. The Soviet Union may have more trouble than 
the other communist countries in getting its economy to work, and the 
U.S. is having trouble with its long term vitality. Meanwhile, the coun­
tries that are the most successful in economic terms are relatively small. 
What matters is not a comfortable home market but the competitive pres­
sure that follows from international exposure. Rewards do not first and 
foremost emanate from dominance in the domestic market or richness in 
natural resources, but rather from economic incentives, high quality of 
human capital, and emphasis on world markets.
In the Third World, the image of a ‘bloc’ of poverty-stricken and ex­
ploited countries has started to fade. The doctrines upon which the Third 
World based itself have become less relevant and less realistic. Of course, 
this is not to say that there are not many countries in a deplorable state, 
and some will continue to be poor because of gravely inhospitable condi­
tions. Still, it is increasingly accepted that many contribute to their econ­
omic and social debacle by inept, not to say disastrous, economic policies. 
More and more of them are looking to East Asia to acquire some kind of 
model for development.
As the Cold War seems to be over, and the ideological cleft between 
rich and poor countries diminishes, foreign policies of appeasement and 
coexistence can be applied at less risk. The security problems have not 
disappeared, but ‘new’ sources of conflict may abide around the comer. 
History makes it necessary to remember that, unfortunately, there is a tra­
dition here. Worries now increasingly concentrate on what Berlin and 
Tokyo eventually may come to wish. Unable to pursue an independent 
foreign policy into military might, these players have concentrated their 
energies on economic pursuits. This has again provided them with the 
means to widen, should they wish to, their foreign policy into military 
might. Or have they found that the goals of foreign policy are better 
achieved through international trade and investments than through diplo­
macy and the power to pursue the ultimate stage of diplomacy?
The fact is that Japan and a reunited Germany are centers of the two 
regions that now attract everyone’s attention. Japan’s growth-miracle is 
being followed by that of the Asian Newly Industrialized Economies 
(NIEs), and behind them the countries in the Association of South-East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) are following a similar path. Germany is tem­
porarily burdened by the reconstruction and assimilation of its Eastern 
part, but is no doubt the heavy-weight of the European Community (EC). 
Along with the Single Market, which is to be completed in the EC by 
1992, changes are sweeping across Eastern Europe as planned economies 
turn market oriented. As the largest capital-goods exporter in Europe, 
and also due to cultural and structural ties, Germany will probably benefit 
the most from the expected economic revitalization of Eastern Europe .
With a diminished role for the U.S. in the world economy, and the lack 
of a single champion of free trade, the major question is now what paths 




























































































of how these regions will behave with regard to each other. Looking at 
simple comparisons of trade and investment figures, the potential relation­
ship between Europe and East Asia must be viewed as underexploited. 
With the appearance of the EC as the world’s largest single market by 
1992, East Asia is pushing for a change of this state of affairs. But the EC 
is preoccupied with its own restructuring, and it is still unclear what its 
external policy will look like.
As we are witnessing the formation of a free-trade area in North Ame­
rica, and a ‘non-treaty’ organization in the Pacific, there is a fear of a seg­
mentation of the world economy into ‘blocs’ of countries which would 
liberalize trade amongst themselves, but pursue protectionist policies vis- 
à-vis each other. In 1986, 34.4 per cent of the world’s total trade was of 
the intra-area kind (IMF, 1988). Moreover, tariff preferences granted un­
der preferential trading arrangements affected more of world exports 
than preferences granted under the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP).
Some observers have believed that the European Economic Space (EES) 
would be a possible means for the West European outsiders to participate 
in the momentum that is hoped to be established by 1992. Meanwhile, 
1990 and 1991 may in retrospect turn out as revolutionary as 1992 prom­
ises to be, as Eastern Europe enters the world economic stage in an un­
scheduled way. In that case, the EES could serve to accommodate the re­
forming countries of Eastern Europe. The negotiations between the EC 
and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) indicate, however, that 
countries which harmonize their policies with the EC but remain outside 
will have little chance to influence its policies. Countries like Austria and 
Sweden consequently seem to be heading for membership, and others may 
follow.
All in all, we are entering an era of new challenges, opportunities and 
risks. There are more favourable opportunities for peaceful coexistence, 
and there is a more general acceptance of the usefulness of functioning 
market systems. At the same time, there is no clear leadership defending 
openness in trade and investment as old champions for free trade change 
clothes, and new ones have not yet fully dressed. In this situation, new 
protectionist tendencies grow stronger, and it may become more impor­
tant to be part of an economic ‘bloc’.
The interaction between Europe and East Asia is very much at the heart 
of which way the world economy is to go. This, in turn, will have a pro­
found influence on the welfare of future generations world wide. Of 
course, there are many other issues which are acutely pressing. Poverty 
forces many people to live on the edge of survival in countries where po­
pulation growth rates remain high. Expanding industrial activities increas­
ingly threaten our global ‘commons’, such as the oceans and the atmo­
sphere. Handling such matters will require an improved allocation of re­




























































































There can be no doubt that this will be greatly facilitated by an open trade 
and investment regime.
Focusing on the relationship between Europe and East Asia, this paper 
is organized as follows. Chapter 2 establishes the gravity shift that has 
taken place between the Atlantic and the Pacific, and surveys causes as 
well as consequences of East Asian dynamism. Chapter 3 analyses the im­
pact of East Asian dynamism on trade policies, towards protectionism as 
well as liberalization. Chapter 4 investigates the third leg of the world tri­
angle in trade and investments, which is the not fully developed relation­
ship between Europe and East Asia, and how this might be affected by EC 
1992. Chapter 5 presents an agenda for a European policy vis-à-vis East 
Asia. Chapter 6 summarizes.
2. Economic and Political Consequences 
of East Asian Dynamism
2.1 The Gravity Shift
There has been a gradual increase in the economic importance of the Pa­
cific for over three decades now. This follows from a simple comparison 
of the statistics concerning income, trade and international investments. 
The unprecedented rise of Japan is also evident in the value of stock ex­
change, the market share of industrial corporations, technological prog­
ress, international assets of banks, and so on.
The term ‘East Asia’ is here understood to be Japan, the four Newly In­
dustrialized Economies (NIEs), and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN).1 The ‘Asian Pacific region’ also includes Australia, 
New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and the island states of the South Pa­
cific. To get the whole ‘Pacific Basin’ we also include China, the Canadian 
and the U.S. western seaboard states. Of course, Indochina, Burma, and 
the Democratic Republic of Korea are also part of the region, but have 
here been left out of the statistics.
Table 1 presents basic data on population, area, GDP and GDP per 
capita for the countries in the Pacific basin which are the most important 
from an economic viewpoint. Table 2 shows the shares of various Asian- 
Pacific countries in world population, area and income (USSR and East­
ern Europe excluded) as of 1987. It can be seen, among other things, that 
the Asian-Pacific region holds 11.1 per cent of the world’s population, 
12.4 per cent of its area and 20.5 per cent of GDP.
From Table 3 it is evident that there has been a significant increase in 
the weight of the Asian Pacific region, as well as of the Asian Pacific 1
1 The four East Asian Newly Industrialized Economies are; The Republic of Korea, The Republic of 
China (Taiwan), Hong Kong and Singapore. Singapore also belongs to ASEAN, whose other members 




























































































Basin, in terms of income. For example, the Asian-Pacific share of world 
GDP increased from 7.8 per cent in 1960 to 20 per cent in 1987. The Pa­
cific Basin GDP increased from 38.5 per cent of the Atlantic Basin GDP 
in 1960 to 62.9 per cent in 1987. Finally, comparing the Asian-Pacific 
GDP with that of Europe, there was an increase from 27.5 per cent in 
1960 to 63.7 per cent in 1987.
The increased Asian-Pacific weight is equally visible in trade statistics. 
As reported in Table 4, Asian-Pacific exports increased from 9 per cent 
of World exports in 1960 to 22 per cent in 1988. Compared to U.S. trade, 
the Asian-Pacific is considerably larger. Compared to European trade, the 
Asian-Pacific is not much behind if we exclude the intra-regional trade. 
U.S. trade with the Asia-Pacific had surpassed U.S. trade with Europe in 
1980, and was 40 per cent larger in 1988. Meanwhile, EC trade with the 
Asia-Pacific has grown to about the same size as EC trade with the U.S.
It is also worth noting that the four small East Asian NIEs, which have 
about 70 million inhabitants altogether, now account for about 70 per cent 
of all exports of manufactures from developing countries. In the mid 
1980s, the small Asian NIEs accounted for a larger import penetration 
ratio2 than did the Latin American NIEs Mexico and Brazil in all OECD 
countries except Italy (OECD, 1985).
In many dimensions, the Pacific Basin will no doubt have overtaken the 
Atlantic Basin by the year 2000. In some respects, this gravity shift has 
already taken place. For further comparisons, see Burenstam Linder 
(1986).
2.2 Causes o f Growth
To discuss the consequences of East Asian dynamism it is important to 
have some understanding of its fundamental causes. Of course, there have 
been many disparate efforts to explain East Asian growth. Many of them 
have focused on factors that are unique to the region. Such ad hoc expla­
nations include references to Confucian values, the economic skills of the 
Chinese and Chinese minorities, the Japanese ethos, the industriousness 
and high level of education in the region, lack of raw materials, abundant 
U.S. aid, political stability, and so forth.
A basic problem with these explanations is their ad hoc nature. The re­
gion is heterogeneous in every way, with countries differing in history, 
constitution, race, size, resource endowments, and climate. Yet, high 
growth is the typical pattern in the countries here referred to as East Asia. 
The countries in Indochina, Burma, and North Korea, on the other hand, 
display a very different record. China itself made impressive progress 
from 1979 onwards, but seems to have set itself back with the retreat 
from economic reforms after last year’s events in Tiananmen Square.
2 By import penetration ratio is meant the share of apparent domestic consumption, i.e. domestic produc­




























































































These differences in performance point towards a major influence of eco­
nomic policies. Needless to say, this does not leave out the importance of 
exogenous factors. Little (1981) concluded that the success of the Asian 
NIEs is entirely due to ‘good policies and the people’. These are not really 
separate explanations, rather ‘good people’ have pursued good policies, 
and good polices have been facilitated by ‘good people’.
While the specific design of policies differs across countries, those that 
have succeeded share certain basic characteristics. The most clear-cut and 
general difference from other developing countries is that East Asia has 
pursued relatively more export-oriented policies. While East Asia has 
promoted sales on world markets, exposure to competition and utilization 
of scale advantages, other developing countries have tended rather to bias 
their incentive systems away from world markets and comparative advan­
tage. Using indices for price distortions, it has been shown that the devel­
oping countries in East Asia have had considerably less distorted prices 
than most other developing countries (The World Bank, 1983).
This is not to say that the East Asian countries, with the exception of 
Hong Kong, have practiced laissez faire. Export promotion has not taken 
place through a general liberalization of imports, but there has been a 
combination of exchange rate management and fiscal incentives for ex­
ports. In addition to the provision of infrastructure and other minimal 
functions, the governments can be said to have intervened in four broad 
areas:
i) they have actively engaged in industrial development through indus­
trial incentives,
ii) they have claimed responsibility for macroeconomic stability,
iii) they have, in some cases, intervened in the distribution of ownership 
through land reform, and
iv) they have set up some public enterprises to produce private goods.
Of these four functions, it is clear that the fourth one has been a 
relatively unimportant factor in the growth of the region. The state- 
owned companies in East Asia are not particularly ‘small’ e.g. compared 
to Latin America, but their share of industry is still small relative to that 
of the private sector, and their growth has been low throughout, with the 
exception of the oil sector in Indonesia (Riedel, 1988).
The importance of the second and third factors has been emphasized for 
Japan, Taiwan and Korea (Sachs, 1986). Regarding macro-economic pol­
icy, government budgets have been kept in balance a fact, which has con­
tributed to high savings and low inflation rates among other things. No­
minal exchange rates have been adjusted so as to keep real exchange rates 
at reasonable levels. The good public finances have allowed governments 
not to promote industrial growth at the cost of taxing agriculture which, 
rather, has been protected compared to industry. At the same time, the 




























































































peasantry of independent proprietary farmers which has lent support to 
the national governments.3
The involvement of governments in the management of private indus­
tries is the hardest to evaluate. Korea, for example, has supplemented 
moderate protectionism with selective export promotion, achieving neu­
trality on the whole. Whether the economic performance would have been 
even better without this kind of interference we do not know. It is clear, 
however, that the measures used have generally aimed at stimulating the 
efficiency of markets. Incentives have promoted activities in line with 
comparative advantage; at one point labour-intensity, at another capital- 
intensity. Input and output prices have been carefully maintained at the 
level of the world market, so as to encourage competition. Concerning 
technology, governments have intervened to promote the bargaining posi­
tion of domestic firms relative to foreign ones, and facilitated the ex­
ploitation of static and dynamic scale economies (Hong, 1990).
Moreover, East Asia has not used policy interventions to make life easy 
for business. Rather, there is a joint and continuous effort on the part of 
government and private firms to foster the development of the latter, 
spurring them to adapt to changing circumstances and achieving success in 
world markets. For Japan, Johnson (1982) characterizes the state as de- 
velopmentally oriented, in contrast to the regulatory state of the West. 
Interventions have been promotional rather than restrictive. Private ini­
tiatives and ownership have been at the core of the process.
Another factor to take note of is foreign capital. Commercial borrow­
ing has been less extensive than in most of Latin America, even consider­
ing that South Korea borrowed heavily in the late 1970s, and the Philip­
pines and Indonesia continue to suffer from considerable and troublesome 
debt burdens. A great deal of foreign development assistance from the 
United States no doubt contributed to setting growth off in countries such 
as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia. Compared to other devel­
oping regions, however, only direct investment -  undertaken by private 
corporations -  is more prominent in East Asia.
Direct investment has played a conspicuous role in East Asia for a long 
time. In the wake of colonization there were at first substantial European 
investments for extraction and distribution of natural resources, especially 
in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Before long, the U.S. became the 
predominant source of direct investment, focusing on the Philippines and 
Taiwan in addition to those countries just mentioned. However, Japan and 
South Korea were not particularly welcoming to foreign direct invest­
ment, while China was an entirely closed country.
3 These land reforms were facilitated by historical incidents, notably the defeat of the Japanese in the sec- 
ond World War, and the takeover by the mainlanders in Taiwan. As is well-known, no such incidents have 
occurred in the Philippines, which has not been able to carry out any real reform of the extremely unequal 





























































































In the 1980s, Japanese financial institutions have became major players 
in the Euro-dollar markets. Low capital standards and dividend pressure 
made it possible for them to focus on size and market share, and interest 
rate regulations at home allowed them to arbitrage on price or with re­
spect to risk (Dufey, 1990). Further supported by high savings at home, 
the current account surplus and the appreciation of the yen from 1985, the 
total international asets of Japanese banks grew from less than those of US 
banks in 1983 to more than three times as much in 1990. During these 
years Japanese banks and industrial firms have also evolved as major 
sources of direct investment world wide, and they have overtaken the 
West as the dominant investor in most of East Asia.
At present, Japanese direct investment seems to serve as a locomotive 
for growth in East Asia as a whole. At the same time, there is a fear of 
dependence on Japan in many countries, and a resentment of the cultural 
influence it may inflict. The Japanese are sensitive to these fears, and ac­
tively work on making their activities stand out as a positive contribution 
to social welfare in the host countries. In recent years, there has also been 
a great deal of direct investment from Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore in other countries in East Asia. This can be expected to con­
tinue as the Asian NIEs often have the technology that is the most suitable 
for effective operations in developing countries.
There is little doubt that the internationalization of business within East 
Asia constitutes a major factor for the spread of growth and exploitation 
of differences in factor costs as well as natural resources. A popular illus­
tration of the development of the region is that of ‘the flying wild geese’. 
Following the ‘leading goose’ in a wide formation, the individual coun­
tries move up the industrial ladder after each other, chasing those ahead as 
changing factor price relations alter comparative advantages. In this pro­
cess, the mobility and flexibility of private business is a key factor.
Finally, it can be noted that the growth in East Asia defies the tradi­
tional wisdom that there would be a conflict between growth policies and 
policies for greater equity (Kuznets, 1965). In East Asia, a more equal in­
come distribution has been achieved by land reforms and large invest­
ments in human capital, for example, through educational reforms. As 
pointed out by Stiglitz (1990), there may well be a positive relationship 
between equity and efficiency in a world of imperfect information.4
The spectacular growth performance in East Asia has strongly affected 
the rest of the world. In the following sections, we will distinguish be­
tween three different external effects: a) the demonstration effect, b) the 
opportunity of a bigger world, and c) the threat to established interests.
4 From the Wicksell Lecture of May 15lh 1990, 'Whither Socialism? Perspectives from the Economics 




























































































Growth explained by reference to a set of economic policies may be pos­
sible to duplicate by other countries. The image of a growth ‘miracle’ is 
displaced by that of a growth ‘model’. The fact that the East-Asian coun­
tries are so different lends support to the idea that others can replicate 
their performance. A resemblance to the policies originally favoured by 
the West in the early phases of its industrialization lends further support 
to this reasoning: It can be repeated -  you can do it too!
The demonstration effect has already had considerable influence on the 
policies of other developing countries. Spurred by the striking differences 
in economic performance, China pursued economic reform for ten years, 
until the surge for political freedom resulted in crude violence and a set­
back of policies. Vietnam and Laos, on the other hand, are now relaxing 
their planned economies at a much greater pace. They seem likely to con­
tinue to do so together with Cambodia, if only the unfortunate conflict in 
that country can be solved.
The emulation of the East Asian example in practice encompasses at­
tempts both to let markets determine prices in previously planned econ­
omies, and to expose protected economies to competition from world 
markets. The pace of change is still low in Africa and Latin America, 
however. Similarly, governments seldom assume a constructive role re­
garding equity issues, which could be conducive to economic growth. The 
Philippines and most Latin American countries, for example, are marked 
by extreme inequality in the distribution of land and human capital. As the 
development of Japan and the Asian NIEs continues, however, the eyes of 
politicians elsewhere are bound to focus more and more on the possibili­
ties underscored by their examples.
The demonstration effect has influenced development theory as well. 
Neo-marxism and the ‘dependency’ school of ‘unequal exchange’ have 
expired. While the traditional import substitution school5 argued that 
secularly falling terms of trade and limited export markets would make it 
impossible for developing countries to rely on world markets, precisely 
those countries that have gone for the world market have succeeded in 
achieving development. Likewise, planning has been discredited and few 
countries now prepare much advertised ‘Five Year Plans’ of the sort that 
used to prevail in the past. Similarly, there is considerably less call for a 
New World Economic Order -  with regulated international trade and 
prices, and ‘massive resource transfers’.
East Asian dynamism has, of course, had a profound impact on Marxian 
and neo-Marxian theory. It can be seen in writings such as the Communist 
manifesto that Marx looked upon capitalism as a powerful engine of 
growth which would spread to the poor countries and set up a process of 
growth there, too. The breakdown of capitalism would come later because
2.3 The Demonstration Effect




























































































of the inner contradictions of strong capitalist growth. It was neo-Marx­
ists, impatient with the downfall of capitalism, and unwilling to experi­
ence capitalism in developing countries, who formed the arguments of 
exploitation of poor countries.
The demonstration effect has also had some implications for neoclassi­
cal economics. As already commented on, the development in East Asia 
does indicate a role for government. This, however, is the role of sup­
porting and spurring activities in private firms, correcting for market 
imperfections and thereby facilitating the functioning of markets. The ar­
guments concern mainly what scope and kind of government intervention 
is desirable.
Concerning the virtues of an export-oriented growth strategy, there is 
now little disagreement in regard to East Asia. As for other countries, 
objections are still raised about its viability. It has been argued, for ex­
ample, that export-orientation makes developing countries dependent on 
growth in the industrialized countries, so that the former do well only 
when the latter do. This argument is effectively countered by the rapid 
growth of the market shares of the NIEs in the industrialized countries 
(see Table 8).
Another, more biting, counter-argument to export-orientation can be 
referred to as the ‘adding-up problem’. The Asian NIEs have already 
penetrated the markets of the industrialized countries with such fierceness 
that they are accused of unfair trade behaviour. As a consequence, the 
rich countries have increasingly used quantitative restrictions to protect 
their industries. Since 1977, many of the developed countries have as­
signed a global market share to the developing countries in general, and 
then distributed quotas for individual countries within that global quota. 
With more and more developing countries competing for industrial ex­
ports, the protectionist pressure would finally become irresistable. Thus, 
the traditional elasticity pessimism of those in favour of import substitu­
tion has been replaced by a new one, based on the protectionist measures 
applied against new producers in the Third World.
For a number of reasons, the new elasticity pessimism may exaggerate 
the difficulties of other developing countries to follow East Asia on the 
track of export orientation. Greater exports from developing countries 
also mean increased purchasing capacity and larger imports. Hence, there 
will not necessarily be any larger deficits for the developed countries, but 
simply more trade. Moreover, there are improved possibilities for trade 
between developing countries. This becomes increasingly so as they de­
velop at different pace, and turn more complementary in nature.
Another counter-argument against the rise of protectionism has been 
brought forward by Bhagwati (1988), who stresses the paramount role of 
multinational corporations in international trade. Because such a great 
part of world trade takes place within these firms, they have a lot to gain 




























































































ingly international, they are likely to set up more and more resistance 
against protectionist measures.
Still, there is certainly some merit to the worrying about trade policies 
in developed countries. There can be no doubt that they have held the 
growth rates of exports e.g. in clothing and textiles below potential. This 
reduces the strength of the demonstration effect among policy makers in 
the Third World. The future significance of this factor is not yet clear, 
however. The matter will be returned to in Chapters 3 and 4.
2.4 The Opportunity o f a Bigger World
The Asian-Pacific region has not only greatly expanded its exports. As 
can be seen from Table 5, imports have increased dramatically as well. 
For example, the region’s imports from the U.S.went from US $3 billion 
in 1960 to US $98 billion in 1988. In the same period, imports from Eu­
rope went from US $3 billion to US $83 billion. Nonetheless, the Ameri­
can and European market shares in the Asia-Pacific have declined, as can 
be seen in the lower part of the .table. The reason is that intra-regional 
trade has expanded fast enough for all market shares of external regions 
to diminish. East Asia contains without comparison the world’s most 
rapidly expanding markets.
Consider, instead, the share of countries’ exports going to East Asia. 
Table 6 reports that the share of U.S. exports going to this region ex­
panded rapidly from 13 per cent in 1960 to 27 per cent in 1988. Because 
of the great increase in intra-regional trade in Europe, the share of Euro­
pean exports going to East Asia remained stagnant over the period as a 
whole. Still, it rose from 3.7 per cent to 5.6 per cent between 1980 and 
1988. And, if we exclude European intraregional trade, we see a marked 
increase in the share of European exports going to East Asia between 
1960 and 1988. In fact, it almost doubled in the 1980s, reaching 19 per 
cent of EC’s total external exports today.
The benefits of expanding export opportunities due to increasing mar­
kets elsewhere usually do not need much arguing to establish. However, a 
country exports basically to be able to pay for its imports. As long as it 
does not want to donate means to foreigners, or build up credits abroad 
purely for their own sake, this is the only reason to export. So, if new­
comers on the world’s economic scene provide new opportunities for im­
ports, this should be seen as an advantage.
Without doubt, consumers everywhere are quite willing to turn to 
goods provided by East Asian producers. Importers of capital goods and 
intermediate goods are similarly interested in imports from East Asia. 
Table 7 shows that U.S. imports from East Asia rose from some US $2 
billion in 1960 to US $180 billion in 1988. Europe (OECD) imported for 
just over US $3 billion in 1960, and for US $120 billion in 1988. As a 
percentage of total imports, the U.S. imported 15 per cent from the Asia 




























































































European share of imports from East Asia rose from only 6 per cent to 9 
per cent. The increase was larger in the case of Sweden, for which the 
share coming from the Asia-Pacific rose from about 3 per cent to 10 per 
cent.
The growth in East Asia has yielded advantages beyond the increased 
scope for trade. The competitive pressure has increased in most branches, 
which should enhance the economic performance of all countries. Fur­
thermore, there are new opportunities for investments nationally and in­
ternationally because of larger markets as well as faster growth of tech­
nology. This has particularly been the case as Japanese R&D has caught up 
and passed from copying to leading in a number of fields. This change has 
intensified the ‘high tech’ race; policy makers and executives in the U.S. 
and Europe have been forced to try harder in order not to be outcom- 
peted, and other countries have been able to import new technologies. At 
the same time, the West has leamt what licensing arrangements can do in 
the hands of an innovative imitator, which has made the U.S. and the EC 
considerably more reluctant to provide NIEs with advanced technology. 
Although the individual firms and governments in developed countries 
have not been able to coordinate any effective blockade in technology, it 
has become increasingly important for the NIEs to invest in R&D them­
selves.
Not only is there a race for ‘high tech’ leadership, but also what might 
be referred to as a ‘high ec’ competition, i.e. a competition between eco­
nomic systems. As we have already argued, East Asian dynamism has 
added new insights into the importance of markets. At the same time, it 
has demonstrated that governments can play a positive role in relation to 
markets.
On a less elevated plane, Japanese corporate management is the object 
of much study, not least in regard to ongoing technological progress. 
Methods for organizing the labour force, such as seniority wages, life­
time employment and job rotation have been investigated by a great num­
ber of researchers (see e.g. Okimoto and Rohlen, 1988). Abegglen and 
Stalk (1985) describe the competitive drive of Japanese companies, their 
growth bias and aggressive way of dealing with competitors. Aoki (1988) 
models the development of communication and incentive systems in 
Japanese firms which, he argues, are superior to those in the West in some 
respects.
2.5 The Threat to Established Interests
East Asian competition is not just experienced by the outside world as a 
source of benefits. On the contrary, the producers exposed to it are sel­
dom thankful. The U.S. as well as Europe have had much to say about the 
competitive practices of East Asian firms and the export surpluses which 
East Asian countries have been running from the 1980s. Most accusations 




























































































tensity in Washington through the 1980s, and the U.S. exerts pressure on 
Japan to reduce its protection at home. The fact is that Japan has reduced 
both its tariffs and its non-tariff barriers. Traditional trade obstacles -  
which are covered by GATT rules -  are lower than, or as low, as in other 
industrial countries, cf. IMF (1988). In any case, they are certainly lower 
than in the U.S. Intensive criticism continues against those import restric­
tions which continue to exist -  notably on agricultural products -  and 
against ‘structural impediments’. The so-called ‘Structural Impediments 
Initiative’ is trying to force Japan to reduce its domestic savings rate and 
change the multi-layer domestic distribution system which complicates the 
introduction of new products.
It can only be stated that there are strongly varying views on whether 
the Japanese market actually is closed or not. Leaving aside the favorite 
anecdotes and looking at some simple comparisons on the import be­
haviour of Japan and other countries, it seems difficult to argue that Japan 
imports ‘too little’ from the U.S. For example, West Germany, France 
and Italy have a combined GDP which surpasses that of Japan. Still, the 
U.S. exported only US $31.2 billion to these countries in 1988, compared 
to US $37.7 billion to Japan.
Criticism about protectionism at home has increasingly targeted the 
Asian NIEs as well. The background is, of course, their success through­
out a wide industrial spectrum. Table 8 reports the import penetration ra­
tios (see note 3) of NIEs in the major EC markets, the U.S., Australia, 
Japan and Sweden in 1970 and 1985. Figures are given for total manufac­
turing, textiles, electrical machines and appliances, and communication. 
As can be seen, the NIEs recorded a significant increase in all the EC 
countries in every product group included in the table, as well as in total 
manufacturing. In the U.S., Australia and Sweden it was even higher, 
while it was lower in Japan. Broadly speaking, the highest ratios were 
recorded in textiles and radio & TV. The Asian NIEs were responsible 
for most of the increase throughout.
In terms of protectionist policy, the Asian NIEs leave room for criti­
cism to a varying degree. Taiwan and, especially, Korea operate a number 
of import obstacles, but less so than comparable LDCs. Export promotion 
also means that resources are not biased into import substitution, which 
makes the market mechanisms less distorted and, in effect, the domestic 
markets less protected. Tariffs have also been reduced and many other 
obstacles to imports dismantled during the last few years. Singapore has 
relatively few trade obstacles, and Hong Kong is undoubtedly the freest 
trader that exists. The developing countries in ASEAN, followers of the 
NIEs in industrialization, are more protected, especially Indonesia. Still, 
their trade policies are considerably more liberal than those of other de­




























































































3. Conflicting Trade Policies: Protectionism 
and Super-Gains from Trade
3.1 Trade Policy Impact o f East Asian Dynamism
Many forces contribute to the shaping of the trade policies pursued by 
countries, groups of countries, or international bodies. Presently, one of 
the most important -  probably the most important one -  is East Asian dy­
namism. Other countries have generally found it necessary to design their 
policies in such a way as to deal with the new situation and, possibly, leam 
from the successful entrance of East Asia on the international economic 
stage.
The various East Asian influences on trade policies can be divided in 
five different categories:
i) Protectionist measures, in the U.S. as well as in Europe, to reduce 
competitive pressures.
ii) Protectionist threats, primarily in the U.S., aimed at ‘opening up’ the 
East Asian market.
iii) Trade liberalization, undertaken by LDCs in and out of the region, in 
order to improve competitive positions.
iv) Trade liberalization in the form of economic integration, in Europe, 
North America, and to some extent in the Pacific Basin, in order to 
organize oneself so as to duplicate and/or continue East Asian 
growth.
v) Deregulation of domestic economies, mostly by previously state- 
planned countries but also in the West, in order to create or improve 
the functioning of markets. This includes institutional changes that 
facilitate countries’ engagement in international trade.
Some of these developments in international trade policy are contradic­
tory. Protectionist pressures and policies are spreading, especially in the 
U.S. The EC has also instituted an increasing amount of trade obstacles, 
not least in their relations with East Asia. As regularly calculated by 
GATT, a high percentage of international trade is subjected to protection­
ist measures other than tariffs. The current debate is dominated by pro­
tectionist pronouncements and there is much talk about the risk of ‘trade 
wars’.
As far as protectionism is concerned, we are mostly concerned with the 
U.S. in this chapter. Of course, there have always been isolationist forces 
at work within this country. Still, the U.S. can be regarded as the prime 
champion of free trade since the end of World War II. For this reason, its 
gradual ‘drop-out’ of that camp represents the most fundamental change 
in attitudes taking place in this field today. In Chapter 4, we will look 





























































































During the 1980s, the U.S. negotiated, or increasingly often imposed, a 
number of import restrictions. These were particularly imposed against 
East Asia. Aggressive anti-dumping and countervailing duties, rather than 
voluntary export restraints (VERs) and orderly market agreements 
(OMAs), became the preferred instruments. The tendency is a weakened 
commitment to multilateralism, and steps being taken towards bilateralism 
as well as unilateralism. This is most ominous in the form of arbitrary 
‘fair trade’ provisions like the ‘Regular 301’ and ‘Super 301’. There are 
also vociferous calls for ‘managed trade’ with demands for reciprocity, 
not in opportunities but in ‘results’. These ‘results’ should come from 
sweeping East Asian structural reforms to accommodate U.S. exporters. 
More concretely, there are now two parallel trade policy ‘discussions’ 
going on between Washington and Tokyo. These are the Super 301 nego­
tiations and the Structural Impediments Initiative.
Under the ‘Super 301’ provision, the Administration must report to 
Congress in the spring of each year and identify countries for bilateral 
negotiations aimed at removing specific trade barriers that damage U.S. 
exports. Japan, together with India and Brazil, was cited under 301 in 
1989. Bilateral discussions with Japan deal with import barriers to foreign 
satellites, super computers, semiconductors, and forest and agricultural 
products.
Of course, the U.S. does not speak only with one voice, and the Admin­
istration is less protectionist than Congress. The Administration takes total 
interests -  and not just vested interests -  into account. It therefore has 
strong incentives to avoid confrontation with Japan, being a major power 
with considerable influence on macro policy conditions. The Administra­
tion has -  both under Reagan and Bush -  emphasized efforts to open East 
Asian markets rather than close the U.S., thus threatening protection to 
avoid protection. Carla Hills, the US Trade Representative, defends Super 
301 as a market opening, non-protectionist device.
In practice, it may be that both the ‘Regular 301’ and ‘Super 301’ rep­
resent dangerous interventions in trade not because of what they do to 
U.S. export policy, but because of what they do to import policy. Their 
effect is to disarm the old option of a president to call for ‘export policies’ 
as a way of doing away with protectionist pressure in the U.S. ‘301’ arms 
a president not with the authority to remove U.S. import restrictions, but 
with the authority to impose new ones. It provides the vehicle to press for 
export expansion without paying the price of removing U.S. import re­
strictions.
The fact is that, although they certainly have trade barriers, the Asian 
NIEs as well as Japan have gradually liberalized their trade regimes. As 
already commented on, Japan probably has fewer government controlled 
trade obstacles than most other countries. Much attention has consequently 




























































































structural impediments in Japan, and ‘differences’ which make exporting 
to this country more difficult.
Above all, Washington wants Japan to reform its multi-layer distribu­
tion system in order to facilitate new imports, rationalize land use to make 
more land available for construction purposes, increase infrastructure in­
vestment, loosen up company groupings (’keiretsu’) to discourage exclud­
ing business practices (such as bid rigging, price fixing, group boycott, 
and market allocation), and to improve protection of intellectual property 
rights (for instance by speeding up processes for granting foreigners 
patent protection). Tokyo retorts by asking the U.S. to tackle at long last 
the problems of its budget deficit, reduce excessive consumption and 
promote savings, increase the availability of low cost capital, and improve 
the educational system to enhance competitiveness. Still, the International 
Herald Tribune (1990a) reported that Kaifu, after the Bush-Kaifu meeting 
in California, promised to undertake the task to ‘firmly tackle structural 
reforms of Japan as one of the top priorities of my cabinet, with a view to 
improving the quality of Japanese life with further stress on the con­
sumer-oriented society’. In spite of these reports, U.S. officials have ex­
pressed doubts that Kaifu, because of domestic political obstacles, will be 
able to deliver on his promises.
The structural reforms that have been requested are really outside the 
control of the usual expenditure switches and adjustments which make up 
the ordinary macro-economic kit. Their undertaking involves fundamen­
tal alterations of Japanese life, and will generate almost by definition a 
great deal of political resistance. Again according to the IHT (1990b), 
‘harsh criticism greets Kaifu on return from Bush talks’. It can be noted 
that the U.S. itself has been unable to deliver on numerous international 
undertakings, also within the Structural Impediments Initiative discussions 
with Japan. Still, redressing the U.S. economic imbalances requires much 
less disconcerting measures, and can be managed through the conventional 
method of adequate macro-economic policies.
If Japan manage the internal political problems of freeing agricultural 
imports and undertaking a number of the structural reforms which have 
been requested, the difficulties of entering its market should diminish. At 
the same time, Japanese exporters would become more efficient and com­
petitive. Capital and labour would be reallocated from inefficient uses in 
agriculture and in the distribution system to efficient export industries. 
For this reason, outside pressures are welcome by many policy makers in 
Japan, intent on undertaking what they find to be to their advantage under 
any circumstances, namely structural reform. The U.S. pressures to ‘open 
up’ Japan may remind us of Commodore Perry’s opening up of Japan in 
1868, and the subsequent enormous increase in Japanese competitiveness.
Protectionist measures may have been provided with a rationale by the 
‘strategic trade theory’ (see e.g. Krugman, 1986). When trade takes place 
under increasing returns to scale, product differentiation and imperfect 




























































































fectly competitive markets disappears. However, similar to the arguments 
for optimum tariffs, it is not easy in practice to apply interventions to 
capture gains through strategic trade policy. Strategic trade theory does 
not tell us under what circumstances interventionist policies can be effec­
tive, how large the gains may be, or whether policy-makers possess the 
information to design them. This is, for example, the conclusion from a 
conference arranged by the NBER (National Bureau of Economic Re­
search) and CEPR (Centre for Economic Policy Research) to explore the 
empirical aspects of strategic trade policy (CEPR Bulletin, 1989).
Protectionist policies will not cure the deficits. As long as the U.S. uses 
more resources through consumption and investment than it produces, the 
balance must ultimately be achieved through an influx of capital from 
abroad, and show up as a deficit on the current account. Of course, the 
natural supplier in the 1980s has been high-saving Japan, which provides 
such a great proportion of the imports that the U.S. is asking for.
3.3 The Diminished Giant Syndrome
One might, then, ask for the real reason behind U.S. protectionism. The 
fact is that balance-of-payments difficulties very often give rise to protec­
tionist activities. National interest groups centering on the necessity of 
retaining this or that industry, or nurturing new industries, play their 
role. The balance-of-payments deficits recorded by the U.S. in the bilat­
eral trade, and the continuing takeover of new and fashionable industries, 
makes it easy to see why ‘Japan-bashing’ has become attractive in Wash­
ington. The de-industrialization that took place during the years of an ex­
aggerated dollar rate now aggravates these sentiments.
What Bhagwati (1989) calls ‘the diminished giant syndrome’ probably 
best explains the ongoing change in U.S. trade policies. The U.S. has lost 
its previous economic dominance, partly through the rise of Japan and the 
Asian NIEs. The concomitant change in U.S. trade policy comes as no 
surprise when viewed from a historical perspective.
Comparing with earlier periods, Great Britain held a secure economic 
superiority in the nineteenth century. At that time, ‘its policy of fair field 
and no favour was also a minimal restatement of the political conditions 
for economic hegemony.’6 By the time of the Great Depression (1873- 
1894), the diminution in Britain’s pre-eminence in the world economy 
had begun. This led to a rise in protectionist sentiments and demands for 
an end to Britain’s unilateral embrace of free-trade principles. ‘Fair trade’ 
and ‘reciprocity’ became promoted by the National Fair Trade League, 
the National Society for the Defence of British Industry, and the Reci­
procity Fair Trade Association. Today, the U.S. follows the same path as 
Great Britain once did. The U.S. and Germany were to Britain what the 
Pacific nations -  and Japan in particular -  are now to the U.S.




























































































To the extent that the US still sets patterns, this development is threaten­
ing. Agricultural policies in violation of GATT rules, which do not make 
an exception for agriculture, is nowadays generally wide-spread in devel­
oped countries. It has been estimated by the Secretariat that the costs to 
the OECD countries are about 1 per cent of real income (OECD, 1990). 
Still, there is much resistance to cope with the problems, and the conflicts 
in interests involved have led to substantial difficulties for the Uruguay 
round. The mess can be traced back to U.S. unilateral action to introduce 
quotas on dairy products in 1950, and on other products in 1951. These 
policies, legalized by the U.S., were happily copied by others with un­
happy results. Similarly, the U.S. legalized protectionism in textiles 
through a VER with Japan in 1957. An instrument was thereby created 
which has been used over and over again by the U.S. itself as well as 
others across a wide range of goods, in spite of its highly detrimental ef­
fects on social welfare.
In the post-war period, U.S. support for free trade and an orderly in­
vestment regime has been much more important than its deviations. As the 
U.S. no longer exercises this important leadership, but instead sets new 
destructive examples, the consequences will be far-reaching. This has, for 
instance, been pointed out in a statement by forty leading U.S. economists, 
among them four Nobel Laureates and four former Chairmen of the 
Council of Economic Advisers in the U.S. Administration (The World 
Economy, 1989).
The arbitrariness of a major power, seeking not rules -  the application 
of which it would be willing to reciprocate when tables turn -  but its own 
ad hoc advantage, has always created deep international animosities. Kin- 
dleberger (1969) claimed that international order is a public good which 
must emanate from a single leading nation. Likewise, Gilpin (1965) main­
tained that a stable, liberal order historically has been the creation of a 
succession of hegemonial powers. He predicted the decline in U.S. hegem­
ony to cause general instability and uncertainty in the world economy.
Such views have not been undisputed. Keohane and Nye (1977) noted 
that shifts in hegemonial power cannot account for variations in the inter­
national structure of issues. A similar controversy has evolved over the 
exposure of foreign investments to political risk in developing countries. 
Allegations that political/ideological motives (related e.g. to U.S. hege­
mony and preparedness to defend foreign investments) would explain the 
variations in nationalizations of foreign-owned firms across countries and 
over time, have largely been discarded (Minor, 1988). Andersson (1991) 
similarly explains the occurrence and distribution of nationalizations 
based on their economic costs and benefits when countries compete for 
gains from foreign investments. The issue at stake in the present context is 
rather under what circumstances the Europeans and others will follow the 
Americans on a possible protectionist trail, and what can be done to re­




























































































3.4 Super-gains from Trade
In the best of all possible worlds, the model of free trade assures us that 
open competition is in everyone’s interest. For this reason, and to prevent 
large countries from discriminating against small ones, there is nowadays 
a more or less universal adherence to the principle of ‘multilateralism’, at 
least in theory. With this is understood that a large power must do to an­
other large power what it does to a small one. Within the framework of 
GATT, there have been substantial reductions in tariff rates in the last 
decades. After successive rounds of multilateral negotiations, the average 
most-favoured-nation (MFN) rates have come down to 5-6 per cent on in­
dustrial products in most developed countries.7
Efforts to estimate the size of the gains from trade through an elimina­
tion of tariffs, for instance in a European customs union, have shown 
these gains to be fairly modest. As indicated above, however, the tendency 
towards protectionism in our time concerns not tariffs but non-tariff bar­
riers (NTBs). This is so even though NTBs generally are considerably 
more detrimental to social welfare in the country which adopts them. As 
has been calculated, e.g. in the Cecchini report (1988) for the European 
Community, the abolishment of NTBs is likely to be associated with major 
economic gains.
NTBs take the form of border as well as non-border measures. They 
include controls for the imposition of domestic taxes and all sorts of in­
spections, protectionist rules for public procurement, transports, tele­
communications, market access and so on. The costs of NTBs in terms of 
reduced welfare and growth come through an inferior allocation of re­
sources, lower economies to scale, reduced competition, and more cum­
bersome macro-economic problems. The reason that they are still insti­
tuted is that a small group of well organized producers often are in the 
position to capture large profits thanks to them, while the losses are 
spread among the large number of consumers. Hence, they tend to be 
detrimental from an equity viewpoint as well.
The East Asian success with an outward oriented development strategy 
has focused attention on gains from trade which go beyond the gains of 
the basic free trade models. In addition, trade can be expected to exert an 
influence on policies, which generates further gains. The following super­
gains from trade can be added to those normally put forward in the litera­
ture;
-  Competition stimulates search processes which are vital for growth. 
International trade enables a larger scale of production, which makes 
fixed costs for improvements in technologies, production methods, 
marketing and investments easier to carry, and improvements more 
profitable. Moreover, international trade makes it more costly not to




























































































search. With a greater number of competitors there is a bigger risk of 
being outcompeted by others engaged in more intensive search.
-  A close contact with foreign markets facilitates and necessitates a feed­
back o f information. In this way, trade stimulates innovation and in­
vention, faster diffusion of new technologies and new production and 
marketing methods.
-  Trade, by allowing a greater number of countries to develop, increases 
the net pool of R&D resources (e.g. money and researchers). To the 
extent that countries such as Taiwan and Korea advance to the techno­
logical frontiers, there will be more and more noticeable competition 
for leadership in ‘high tech’. Japan’s advancement has already released 
such efforts on a large scale in both the U.S. and Europe.
-  A commitment to increased trade in a growing number of countries 
reduces uncertainty in investment which is oriented towards the world 
market, and facilitates an efficient allocation of resources interna­
tionally.
-  There are positive employment effects in less developed countries 
when the factor markets are not distorted so that it pays to use labour- 
intensive production methods rather than the high capital intensity of 
import substitution. Together with the realization of more efficient 
markets this makes it possible to achieve a more equitable income dis­
tribution without compromising incentives.
-  Both management and work forces get used to adjustment needs and 
try to handle them by acting rather than reacting. They do not engage 
so quickly and so much in what has been referred to as ‘directly-un- 
productive activities’, i.e. the spending of resources on persuading 
governments to provide protection and privilege.
-  When gains from trade are clearly recognized, governments are more 
likely to accept change and to weather whatever domestic pressures 
there are to protect against adjustment.8
-  An open economy is more exposed to international economic distur­
bances, but is also better equipped to handle shocks. A large export 
sector can more easily be expanded and imports more easily be con­
tracted. At the same time, the government is better prepared to apply 
macro-economic adjustment tools. In an import substituting country, 
by contrast, income levels are often too low to compress. This means 
that mainly essentials are imported, i.e. costly input goods which are 
necessary to keep the expensive and inefficient production going. 
These differences were highlighted by the differing performances of 
countries during the oil crises of the 1970s.
-  If one can conduct business without constant contacts with the govern­
ment, it is easier to survive in the provinces. This has a positive effect
8 Treaty obligations in the form of GATT rules make it still easier to stand up against pressures for pro- 




























































































on the regional distribution of activities, which contributes to a more 
equitable income distribution overall.
Concerning policies, countries pursue not only tariffs and non-tariff 
trade barriers, but also what we may call ‘domestic trade obstacles’ 
(DTBs). These come in many forms, e.g. subsidies, zoning laws, govern­
ment production, economic planning in general, restrictive practices by 
unions and corporations, limitations on the right of establishment, and so 
on. They could be put into effect by governments or by firms, groups of 
firms, or unions (see further Olson, 1982).
Neither the aim nor the immediate consequence of DTBs is to regulate 
trade. Their effects on international trade appear indirectly, and they are 
often such that it is difficult to classify a regulation as an NTB or a DTB. 
Yet the distinction can usually be made. For example, a rule preventing 
the establishment of foreign banks is an NTB, while a regulation prohibit­
ing banks from owning an insurance company is a DTB.
Tariffs and NTBs give rise to smuggling across national borders. DTBs 
set up similar forces. There is ‘smuggling’ in the form of tax evasion and 
the development of an underground economy. And the more difficult this 
‘smuggling’ is, the more ‘home’ production there will be. The theoretical 
trade models usually assume free domestic trade and then explore the con­
sequences of an opening up of international trade, i.e. a removal of tariffs 
and NTBs. This may obscure important relationships, however. There is 
often a substantial mileage of high domestic trade obstacles and this can be 
the case even in countries with strong support of the ideals of free trade.
As domestic trade obstacles ultimately will have foreign trade effects, 
international trade could have an impact on domestic trade obstacles as 
well. Tariffs and NTBs are eliminated through unilateral decisions, nego­
tiations, cross-country agreements, or some sort of foreign pressure. The 
domestic bank market, for example, may be opened to foreign banks be­
cause it is necessary for the national banks to be permitted to establish 
branches abroad. DTBs may, similarly, be exposed to foreign pressures. 
Typically, however, other countries are likely to accept ‘national treat­
ment’, i.e. they accept domestic obstacles to trade which do not discrimi­
nate against foreigners. DTBs which are the result of private operations 
are also relatively difficult to combat by government decisions. Hence, 
DTBs must often be removed through other mechanisms.
Some DTBs are eliminated through foreign competition as a direct re­
sult of an opening up to international trade. Some domestic monopolies 
and some private restrictive practices may be broken up in this way. Ol­
son (1982) sets out reasons why ‘distributional alliances’ may be harder to 
operate in a wider market. Still, most DTBs are not undone in this direct 
way.
A number of government DTBs could be eradicated through unilateral 
decision (deregulation) in order to increase the international competitive­




























































































better position in relation to their international competitors. A country 
may, for instance, have negotiated the elimination of NTBs preventing the 
establishment of foreign insurance companies. Not to put national insur­
ance corporations at an impossible competitive disadvantage it may be 
necessary as the next step to eliminate domestic trade obstacles in the in­
surance business. A country which eliminates its foreign exchange re­
strictions may similarly find it advantageous to reduce taxes on capital 
market transactions. The more mobile factors, establishments and activi­
ties are across borders, the greater the likelihood that domestic pressures 
will keep obstacles to domestic trade down in an effort to remain interna­
tionally competitive.
The ‘Structural Impediments Initiative’, already discussed in the previ­
ous chapter represents an interesting example of strong international pres­
sure on DTBs, in this case on Japan. The removal of the DTBs targeted 
would mean an elimination of domestic trade obstacles. Foreigners would 
benefit less than the Japanese themselves. Entry would be made easier, 
particularly for new Japanese goods and firms on the domestic market. It 
is also for this reason that some Japanese hope that American pressures 
will help them solve a number of serious domestic problems and eliminate 
DTBs which the government by itself is not strong enough to abolish. 
Openness to trade brings pressures that can help to identify where the ob­
stacles to efficiency are, and furthermore, to generate the political power 
to combat the groups that gain from them. This way, trade can help to 
remove internal obstacles so as to revitalize an economy from within. The 
financial sector is probably as good an example as any merchandise sec­
tor.
The effects of removing DTBs will be positive when they break up ob­
stacles which are undesirable from a social point of view. Domestic trade 
is as important as international trade, and gains from domestic trade are 
basically the same as the gains from international trade. It should be 
noted, however, that some DTBs may be useful regulations of trade. It is 
not in the interest of a society to import all goods. There are, for exam­
ple, goods and services whose consumption is associated with negative 
externalities, such as pollution.
3.5 International Movements towards Trade Liberalization
Parallel to the pressure for protectionism, there are continuous and suc­
cessful movements in favour of liberalization as well. The new protection­
ism sometimes appear to dominate only because, on the whole, trade lib­
eralization efforts are pursued under other headings. One is the Uruguay 
Round, which may eventually lead to further reductions in conventional 
trade obstacles as well as NTBs. The success which the East Asian coun­
tries have recorded with outward-oriented strategies has increased the 




























































































Still, the Third World favors the right of each country to maintain 
whatever policies it likes, and the multilateral negotiations clearly en­
counter substantial difficulties. For LDCs, the Uruguay Round -  except 
for agricultural products -  is actually of limited interest. The East Asian 
demonstration effect, to the extent that it works at all, rather makes LDCs 
look for unilateral reductions, insisting that they be exempted from the 
normal standards of the GATT discipline. The demands concern unilateral 
removal of developed country tariffs, NTBs, and most notably, DTBs. 
Other examples of unilateral reductions include:
-  A number of industrial countries have made unilateral reductions in 
DTBs for domestic profit, but also in order to increase their interna­
tional competitiveness, especially in services.
-  The East European countries are moving unilaterally towards liberal­
ization, particularly in their DTBs. The elimination of DTBs is likely 
to be followed by reductions in tariffs and NTBs, probably with con­
cessions by other countries to begin with. For example, the East Eu­
ropean countries will most likely be accorded MFN treatment and be 
permitted to become members of GATT (which some already are, but 
only in name).
-  East Asian countries are reducing tariffs and NTBs partly as a result 
of foreign pressures, partly to give a sharper edge to their already 
successful trade strategies.
-  The most important efforts to sweep away NTBs, however, are part 
of the greater efforts to achieve the economic integration of coun­
tries. By far the most pervasive example is that of turning the 
‘Common Market’ in Europe into the Single Market. This has been 
paralleled by, and facilitated by, unilateral reductions in DTBs. In­
tentionally or unintentionally, however, the EC may assume rights to 
introduce DTBs. Mrs. Thatcher’s misgivings about yielding authority 
to Brussels are probably not primarily that the EC might become 
protectionist in the sense that it will develop high tariffs or even 
NTBs, but rather that the central authorities will issue increasingly 
ambitious -  that is, restrictive -  European-wide DTBs.
In connection to the 1992 program, there are also negotiations over a 
European Economic Space (EES). The idea has been to cater for free 
trade arrangements between the EC and individual EFTA countries which 
could be tied to the Single Market. The four freedoms -  of goods, ser­
vices, people and capital -  would be extended to the EFTA countries, 
although border controls would remain as the EES is not a customs union. 
In addition to certain specific issues, such as fishing in Nordic waters and 
environmentally sensitive transit traffic in Austria and Switzerland, the 
decision-making process presents complications. The EFTA countries 
want to avoid the humiliation of just having to put into effect decisions al­
ready taken by EC authorities. The EC, on the other hand, does not want 




























































































tonomy of its decision-making. For the time being, there seems to be a 
reasonable chance of a satisfactory agreement. Still, as the tide is moving 
and the EC has the momentum of change in its hand, full or no liberaliza­
tion with regard to the Single Market may turn out to be the only viable 
option for the EFTA countries, unless they are merely to implement the 
decisions already taken by the EC.
There are also efforts towards integration within the Pacific region. 
The Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had already grouped themselves 
together in ASEAN in 1965. Their cooperation has been successful in 
political terms, which perhaps was the primary objective, but the eco­
nomic integration has been meagre. The countries’ heterogeneity and, at 
the same time, competition in trade and investment has prevented any 
great success.9 For very much the same reason, efforts to cooperate in the 
Pacific region as a whole have yielded only a number of forums for gen­
eral political and economic discussions. Being on the periphery, Australia 
has over the years had a special interest in Pacific integration. The efforts 
of the Prime Minister, Mr. Hawke, have resulted in the formation of a 
‘non-treaty organization’. It is unlikely that the foreseeable future will of­
fer anything more ambitious than an OECD-type of organization for the 
Pacific countries.
4. The Third Leg of the Triangle
4.1 Introduction
To sum up some points made in the previous chapters, there is an ongoing 
gravity shift in the importance of economic relationships from the At­
lantic to the Pacific. A key factor behind East Asian dynamism is the 
outward orientation of the region. Its example has exerted a demonstra­
tion effect on the rest of the world and created new opportunities, but 
also set up new risks.
There have been partly contradictory influences on trade policies in 
developed as well as developing economies. Above all, the U.S. has 
stepped down from its position as champion of free trade and capital 
movements. Under the umbrella of GATT, tariffs have been stabilized at 
a low level, and many countries take decisive steps towards an opening up 
of their trade regimes. This has partly been motivated by the costs of the 
new protectionism, and the existence of super gains from trade, some of 
which are conspicuous in East Asia. Openness brings increased competi­
tion, communication, and stimulates not only industrial efficiency but also
9 The differences in national policies have contributed to preventing not only a free trade area, but also 
agreements on 'planned specialization'. Why would the Singaporeans wish to pay high prices for diesel 




























































































human skills. In addition, trade serves to break up domestic trade barriers 
which politicians may not be able to deal with directly.
At the same time there is a tendency towards protectionism in the form 
of NTBs and DTBs, although such measures tend to be much more detri­
mental to social welfare than tariffs. We have noted the argument that a 
liberal world order would require the leadership of a single hegemonial 
power, such as Great Britain in the nineteenth century and the United 
States in part of the twentieth century. The question in our time is 
whether other countries will follow on a trail towards protectionism as 
the U.S. has lost the economic leadership. While the potential advantages 
of going for world markets have been powerfully demonstrated, the 
prospects of new barriers to trade diminish the belief of other developing 
countries that they can emulate the achievements of East Asia.
Thus, some factors point towards liberalization, while others seem to 
favor a protectionist tendency. Which way are we to go? As pointed out 
in Chapter 1, the decline of ‘big’ powers is accompanied by the rise of 
relatively small and more flexible countries which emphasize human 
skills, high specialization and advanced technology. At the heart of these 
developments lies, on the one hand, Japan which is followed by the sur­
rounding East Asian countries and, on the other hand, Germany accom­
panied by the rest of the European Community.
This chapter focuses on the relationship between Europe and East Asia, 
particularly on whether Europe has taken advantage of the opportunities 
and faced up to the risks that emanate from East Asian dynamism. Ini­
tially, we will consider some trade and investment figures. The process of 
integration in the EC is thereafter reviewed, as well as the expected ef­
fects of the 1992 program. This is followed by an analysis of the risk for 
external protectionism in the EC.
4.2 A Triangle o f Economic Relations
The bulk of world trade in goods and factors as of today can be charac­
terized as a triangular flow. This triangle consists of the U.S., Europe, 
and East Asia. Broadly speaking, the economic activities along the three 
sides show the following intensities:
-  Between the U.S. and Europe, there are intensive trade and invest­
ment relations.
-  The U.S.- East Asia side of the triangle shows a high trade and in­
vestment activity.
-  Trade and investment relations between East Asia and Europe are 
relatively undeveloped.
To look more closely at the figures behind these broad arguments, we 
consider some alternative measures of trade intensities. Studying the U.S. 
export penetration of Japan, we either compare U.S. exports to Japan 




























































































EC exports to Japan. Because we compare exports from different coun­
tries to one and the same market, the disputed degree of Japanese ‘open­
ness’ to imports does not affect the comparison.
To make figures from different countries comparable, Table 9 elimi­
nates the difference in size between markets by dividing export figures by 
market GDP in the exporting country. In Table 10, on the other hand, the 
export figures are divided by the total exports of the exporting country. 
In this case, intra-EC trade has been excluded in order to facilitate a 
comparison between the US and the EC. In Table 11, these comparisons 
are replicated for exports to Japan in manufacturing alone. Table 12, fi­
nally, calculates the imports from East Asian countries divided by the 
GDP of the importing country.
4.3 Exports, Imports and Direct Investments
In Table 9, it can be seen that the U.S. has had a considerably higher ex­
port intensity to Japan than the EC or Sweden since 1970. Only in 1987 
did the figure for the EC or Sweden surpass 50 per cent of that of the 
U.S. A comparison of the export intensities to South Korea, Taiwan, or 
the Asian NIEs as a whole similarly shows larger figures for the U.S. 
than for the EC or Sweden. Broadly speaking, however, the differences 
were the largest in 1980, and they shrank somewhat up to 1987. In fact, 
the EC-Japan export intensity almost doubled between 1975 and 1987, 
while that of the U.S.-Japan remained stagnant.
In Southeast Asia, on the other hand, Table 9 shows that the U.S. and 
the EC did about equally well. In the 1980s, Sweden was consistently 
ahead of both the U.S. and the EC in Thailand as well as in ASEAN as a 
whole. Compared to the record of Japan, however, all Western countries 
were significantly behind. This applies particularly to the NIEs, where 
Japan recorded an export intensity three times as high as the U.S. or the 
EC in 1987. In ASEAN, Japan’s export intensity was about twice as high 
as those of its competitors in the West.
As can be seen from Table 10, the general patterns in export intensities 
are largely unchanged when exports are divided by total exports instead 
of GDP. However, the U.S. emphasis on Japan and the Asian NIEs rela­
tive to that of the EC is magnified. While the U.S. exported 11 per cent 
of its total exports to Japan, the corresponding figure for the EC was just 
above 5 per cent. Still, the difference has declined significantly over the 
1980s. In ASEAN, the U.S. was marginally ahead of Europe. Further­
more, the substantial Japanese lead recorded in Table 9 is here much di­
minished. The share of Japan’s total exports going to ASEAN in 1987, 
for example, is less than twice as high as that of the U.S. (6.8 per cent 
compared to 3.9 per cent).
As shown by Smith and Venables (1989) among others, the present 
segmentation of the European Community has led to an over-emphasis on 




























































































total external trade, Table 13 shows that the EC’s internal trade increased 
from 108 per cent in 1982 to 142 per cent in 1988. The swamping effect 
of EC’s internal trade is not captured in Table 10 since intra-European 
trade has been excluded. The falling behind of the export intensity of the 
European countries in East Asia that is recorded in Table 10, as com­
pared to Table 9, would consequently have been further magnified had 
the intra-European trade been included.
Considering only manufactured exports, Table 11 shows that the gen­
eral picture for Japan changes somewhat. As can be seen at the bottom of 
the table, more than 80 per cent of the EC’s exports to Japan consist of 
manufactures, compared to only 50 per cent for the U.S., as of 1985. In 
relation to GDP, the intensity of the EC’s manufacturing exports to Japan 
was much behind that of the U.S. in 1980, but it had almost caught up by 
1985. As a share of total exports, however, the EC exported less than 1 
per cent to Japan when the internal trade of the EC is included. Excluding 
all West European trade, the EC still exported only 2.7 per cent to Japan 
in 1985. For the U.S., the corresponding figure was 5.2 per cent. This 
impression of a greater emphasis on Japan by U.S. manufactured exports 
compared to EC manufactured exports is magnified by a comparison with 
total manufacturing exports. Excluding EC’s internal trade, the EC ex­
ported only 2.6 per cent of its total manufacturing exports to Japan in
1985. The corresponding figure for the U.S. was 7.7 per cent -  or about 
three times as much as the EC!
Turning to import intensities, Table 12 shows a consistently larger 
share of imports from countries in East Asia for the U.S. compared to the 
EC or Sweden. In 1980, the U.S. imported almost twice as much of its 
total imports from Japan as did the EC. While this difference diminished 
up to 1987, the gap instead widened in imports from the Asian NIEs. In 
1987, the US imported 13.1 per cent of its total imports from these 
countries, while the corresponding figure for the EC was only 5.7 per 
cent. In the case of the ASEAN countries, the difference was smaller. It 
can be noted that Japan in 1987 imported a smaller share of its total im­
ports from the Asian NIEs than did the U.S.
Comparing the stock of direct investments, finally, Tables 14 and 15 
indicate a highly skewed pattern. According to the home countries, West 
Germany held 20 times as much investment in the U.S. as in Japan in
1986, and the United Kingdom 40 times as much in 1984. The stock of 
Japanese direct investment in the U.S. is about 2.5 times as large as that in 
Western Europe. The data reported by the host countries show that Japan 
has attracted almost three times as much direct investment from the U.S. 
as from Western Europe. The relatively small numbers recorded for 
Japanese investments in the U.S. as well as in Western Europe have been 
much magnified in the most recent years.
To sum up, the comparisons of intensities in exports, imports and the 
pattern of direct investments point towards an imbalanced triangular flow 




























































































derdeveloped. Europe has done well in increasing its exports in manufac­
turing goods to Japan which, among other things, shows that success can 
be achieved. In terms of its overall manufacturing exports, however, the 
EC sells a much smaller share in Japan than does the U.S. The small 
amount of EC direct investment in Japan, compared to that of the U.S., 
also indicates that the EC has not put much effort into exploiting East 
Asian markets.
4.4 The Imbalances -  Missed Opportunities and Looming Risks
Not only are the economic relations between Europe and East Asia un­
derexploited, but they are also severely imbalanced, and threaten to be­
come even more so in the future. Consider Figure 1, which depicts the 
EC’s trade balance with external countries in relation to the EC’s exports 
to these countries (la), and in percentage of the EC’s total external ex­
ports respectively (lb). The EC had a deficit with the U.S./Canada in 
1982, but this turned into a surplus in 1987 and 1988. With EFTA, the 
EC had a fairly stable trade surplus, amounting to 1-2 per cent of EC’s 
total exports over the period studied. Japan and the other export-oriented 





























































































Figure la: ECS EXTERNAL TRADE BALANCES IN PERCENTAGE OF EXPORTS 
TO REGIONS











































































































Figure 2a; EC EXPORTS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES *
$ bill.
1970  1 98 0  1987
Years
H  Asia 
EM A frica  
EM Europe 
D  Middle East 
CH West.Hem.










1970  1 98 0  1987
Years
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, various issues.
*  The figure includes only the six original EC members plus Denmark, Ireland and the U.K. 



























































































In relation to EC exports to respective country /region, Figure la  shows 
that the deficit with Japan shrank from 200 per cent to about 150 per cent 
in 1988. In relation to the total exports of the EC, however, it can be seen 
from Figure lb  that the deficit with Japan increased from about 4 per 
cent in 1982 to about 7 per cent in 1988. The deficit with the Asian NIEs 
has also grown steadily to about 2 per cent of total EC exports. Trade 
with the other ASEAN countries (excluding Singapore) displays a similar 
trend.
In the EC’s trade with developing countries in general, Asia has be­
come more and more dominant. Figure 2a and 2b depict the composition 
of the EC’s trade with five regions of developing countries in 1970, 1980 
and 1987. As is illustrated in Figure 2a, the Asian countries increased 
their share of EC exports from 15 to 23 per cent. Figure 2b displays an 
even greater increase in the Asian share of EC imports from developing 
countries, up from 11 to 25 per cent in 1987. As for other developing 
countries, those in Europe also increased their share of EC exports, but 
they recorded only a marginal increase on the EC’s import side. The 
‘losers’ in trade with the EC were Africa, the Western Hemisphere and, 
on the import side in the 1980s, the Middle East. At the same time, the 
EC’s trade with developing countries was reduced from over 20 per cent 
of total EC trade in the 1970s to only 17 per cent in 1987.
Thus, East Asian dynamism makes itself felt in large deficits for Eu­
rope in the regional trade between the regions. Trade increases in both 
directions, but the deficits are widening relative to EC’s total trade. This 
is not least the case as East Asia now pays much more attention to Europe 
than it used to do. To provide some anecdotal evidence, Newsweek (1989) 
reported that, according to a Marubeni Corporation employee, there is 
now only standing room on seminars focusing on the EC market. Sumit­
omo Bank is said to devote as much attention to the European market as 
to the U.S. market. Sony has, according to the same article, appointed its 
senior European manager to its board of directors.
In the case of the U.S., the trade imbalances reflect severe macro-eco­
nomic problems, which lays the foundation for additional frictions. A 
macro-economic correction in the U.S., or additional protectionist mea­
sures there, will eventually mean a reduction of U.S. imports of trade and 
investment from East Asia. As the EC propensity to import from East 
Asia is relatively low, there is more room for East Asian efforts to raise 
it. U.S. corrections would further intensify East Asian efforts to sell in 
Europe. Such a re-orientation of East Asian exports and investments 
might, because of the present trade and investment imbalances, stir con­
siderable friction, unless there is a shape-up of EC export and investment 
activities in East Asia.
Of course, there may be nothing wrong or abnormal about bilateral 
deficits in trade and investments. In the present context, however, we will 
see that the business relationship between Asia and Europe is generally 




























































































change this state of affairs, the Europeans have become preoccupied with 
their own restructuring. The imbalances that prevail in trade and invest­
ments consequently indicate missed opportunities, particularly on the part 
of Europeans in East Asia.
Firstly, the fact that the U.S. intensities in exports and investments 
across the Pacific are higher than those of the EC in East Asia might sug­
gest that there are missed opportunities on behalf of the EC in East Asia. 
Second, higher export and investment incentives across the Atlantic than 
those Japan has achieved within Europe indicate that there are still missed 
Japanese opportunities in Europe. Third, the greater export and invest­
ment figures accounted for by the Japanese in both the U.S. and the EC 
might indicate missed opportunities in East Asia on behalf of both these 
regions.
Moreover, U.S. exports to Japan and the NIEs, as well as the size of 
American investments there, out-perform those achieved by Europe. This 
is so in spite of the fundamental imbalances in the U.S. macro-economy. 
While Europeans supposedly have more internationally oriented compa­
nies and management than the Americans, who for long could rely on 
their large domestic market, the U.S. has been more active in East Asia. 
The impression of missed European opportunities is underscored by the 
worries in many East Asian countries of being economically dominated 
by the Japanese, as well as politically dominated by the Americans. Some 
countries, e.g. in ASEAN, are involved in outright efforts to increase the 
European investments.
4.5 Stages o f European Integration
From the early 1970s, the EC’s economic record has deteriorated in abso­
lute as well as relative terms. As can be seen from Table 16, the EC 
countries accounted for about 2-4 per cent annual growth in the period 
1965-1980. Between 1980-86, average annual growth was about one per 
cent (except for the United Kingdom), and in industry it was even less. 
Other regions had lower growth too, but the decline was generally less 
drastic than in the EC. As can further be seen from Table 16, many EC 
countries have above 10 per cent unemployment, which is more than in 
the U.S., Japan or Sweden. The figures for developing countries are not 
directly comparable.
With this kind of economic record, it is no surprise that Europe was 
widely viewed as the ‘tired continent’ up to a few years ago. Eurosclero­
sis became a term for stagnation in old age, in economic terms. In the re­
search project Costs o f non-Europe, the EC Commission partly blamed 
the economic problems on the limited integration of the member econ­
omies. European firms tend to be too small to fully exploit advantages of 
scale, resulting in inefficient resource utilization, while they are too large 




























































































The economic problems, as well as the necessity to handle the new 
competition from the Asian NIEs, have gradually intensified the quest for 
European integration. Broadly speaking, this can be said to have passed 
through three stages:
-  The first period was driven primarily by visions. The Treaty of 
Rome was signed and the great plans laid down to prevent future 
wars between France and Germany. A new Europe was to be con­
structed which could compete economically with the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union, both of which were viewed as formidable competitors 
at the time. By creating an economically stronger Europe, it was 
hoped that electorates would not be attracted to give up political and 
economic freedoms for economic growth. After some years, the po­
litical goal to establish a close relationship between France and Ger­
many seemed to have been reached. The Americans no longer ap­
peared as impossible to beat and most people forgot that there had 
ever been any competitive threat from the economy of the Soviet 
Union.
-  The second phase was initiated as these pressures from the outside 
disappeared, and the EC became characterized by growing bureau­
cracy rather than further liberalization. Brussels increasingly regu­
lated production and trade in agriculture, and also in industries such 
as steel, ship-building, and textiles. The ideals had lost their power, 
and Europessimism grew instead.
-  The third stage is that of the Renaissance. New pressures on Europe 
have developed, at this time in the form of competition from Japan 
and East Asia. The creation of the Single Market is basically the re­
sponse to these new pressures.
4.6 The Effects of the Single Market
Today, the EC serves as a customs union with a common external tariff. 
Apart from this, there is no clear definition of common rules for the ex­
ternal policy. In particular, the EC countries maintain different quantita­
tive restrictions on imports from third countries. In addition, there are 
exceptions from free trade in goods as well as factors within the EC, due 
to e.g. differing technical, hygienic and veterinary standards, and restric­
tions in the right to import services. By 1992, the interior barriers to 
trade are to disappear, public procurement is to be opened up, and the 
factor markets deregulated. An increased budget will support European 
research and development programs, and enable greater common respon­
sibility for environmental, regional and social issues.
The legislative program for 1992 was set out in the 1985 White Paper 
Completing the Internal Market. Its message was reinforced in mid-1987 
by the passing of the Single European Act, which instituted a weighted 
form of majority voting as the norm in the council for its 1992 directive­




























































































market. In June 1988, there was an agreement to remove exchange con­
trols, and in February 1989 a settlement on budget and farm policies. By 
the summer of that year, about half of the roughly 300 European laws of 
the White Paper had been passed. The project can be said to be develop­
ing at a satisfactory pace for completion in 1992.
There is little doubt that the 1992 program actually will result in in­
creased integration. A company located in one member country will be 
able to compete more effectively in the others. Meanwhile, competition 
will increase in its own country. The result will be an improved utiliza­
tion of scale advantages and higher efficiency due to more competition. 
From simulation models it has been concluded that prices will be reduced 
and production will increase in the many industries characterized by scale 
advantages and imperfect competition. Sectors will be affected differ­
ently, however, due to factors such as different transport and communi­
cation costs, and because the present level of competition differs. The 
welfare effects of the resulting structural adjustment, caused by attraction 
of resources from one industry to another, will be complex and require 
careful studying.10
In valuations of the program, the EC Commission has found the out­
come consistently favourable for the Community itself. According to the 
quantitative estimates, the direct and indirect effects will in the medium 
run:
i) cool the economy, deflating consumer prices by 6.1 per cent on aver­
age,
ii) trigger economic activity that adds on average 4.5 per cent to the 
EC’s GDP,
iii) relax budgetary and external constraints and thereby improve the 
balance of public finances by 2.2 per cent of GDP on average,
iv) create 1.8 million new jobs, reducing the jobless rate in Europe by 
approximately 1.5 per cent, and
v) improve the external balance by 1.0 per cent of GDP.
In addition to the major scenario, the EC Commission also considers 
the possibility that governments will give up some gains from fiscal 
consolidation and lower inflation. This would make a 6.5 to 7.5 per cent 
increase in GDP and a 4.4 to 5.7 million increase in employment attain­
able. The deflating of consumer prices would then be between four and 
five per cent, and the external balance worsen somewhat.
The figures are uncertain but indicate the probable direction of ‘static’ 
effects. As stressed by Smith and Venables (1988) on the basis of indus­
trial simulations, there should also be greatly reduced profits and an exit 
of many firms. Several writers have pointed out the possibility of great
10 The prices at which expanding sectors attract factors of production need not reflect socio-economic vai- 
ues due to e.g. imperfect competition. Helpman and Krugman (1985) present some conditions under 




























































































‘dynamic’ effects. Geroski (1988) speaks for more innovation due to in­
tensified competition, while Baldwin (1989) argues that more profitable 
investment would raise the steady-state capital labour ratio -  permanently 
adding a quarter to a full percentage point to growth. These figures are 
even more uncertain, but they point to the possibility of very large ben­
efits over time.
An estimation of the welfare effects of 1992 requires not only consid­
eration of the effects within the EC itself. The presented calculations have 
all assumed unchanged barriers with respect to non-EC countries. In 
practice, there may be either an ‘opening’ or a ‘closing’ of the Commu­
nity to external flows of trade and investment. The EC’s behaviour vis-à- 
vis the rest of the world, and responses from the outside, will influence 
the final outcome.
4.7 EC Protectionism
The deregulation of Europe through the Single Market will no doubt be 
helpful for European economic development. Further gains may be 
achieved through a functioning EES, i.e. the removal of West European 
DTBs, and also East European economic reforms. The result will be re­
duced trade obstacles for outsiders as well. The reduction in DTBs will 
provide economies of scale to Japanese and other East Asian firms as well 
as to other outsiders which approach European markets.
While the EC plans to replace existing national barriers to trade with 
measures that are common for the Community, the Commission has as­
sured that the average level of external protection will not be increased. 
This liberal stance was supported by the composition of commissioners 
instituted in Brussels last year (The Economist, 1989). Pearce and Sutton 
(1986) maintained that the EC as a whole is ‘unlikely to shift to a sys­
tematically more protectionist stance. Such a shift would require a greater 
similarity among member states’ levels of competitiveness and atti­
tudes...’. In fact, the EC has a vested interest in trade, with its external 
exports amounting to 20 per cent of world exports and nine per cent of 
its own GDP.
In spite of these arguments, there is a lack of rules for the external 
trade policy in the White Paper, and the current development does not 
lend support to the official stance of the EC Commission. In 1988, about 
half of all known VERs protected the EC market, and an increasing num­
ber targeted Asia. Table 17 shows that the increase in VERs between 
September 1987 and May 1988 was 100 per cent in the EC, which can be 
compared to 74 per cent in the rest of the world.11 The increase was the 
most pronounced against developing countries (160 per cent), and espe-
11 Table 17 should be viewed with caution. Some increases may have been magnified by a reclassifica- 
tion of actions during the period. The table includes e.g. unilateral EC actions such as EC surveillance 




























































































dally high in agriculture and food products (220 per cent), electronic 
products (200 per cent), textiles and clothing (171 per cent) and ‘others’ 
(500 per cent).
Brussels has announced that most national quantitative restrictions on 
imports are to be scrapped by 1992, but some goods have been said to be 
excepted. Concerning subsidies, the White Paper does not contain any 
precise and concrete proposals regarding the time and implementation of 
their removal, as it does for EC’s inner border controls. It has been more 
or less assured that those subsidies that hurt other member countries will 
disappear by 1992, but this may increase the willingness to use such sub­
sidies against third countries. Furthermore, it has not been made clear 
how the national quotas on textiles allowed under the MFA will be 
shared, and the expensive agricultural policy is a constant source of dis­
tress.
With the introduction of VERs and OMAs, Europe is displaying a ten­
dency to follow the U.S. by putting up its own protectionist measures. 
However, it is particularly the threat of antidumping proceedings which 
has emerged as a powerful bilateral instrument to get around GATT in 
the EC. Obtaining community-wide VERs is difficult in the EC, since ap­
proval of the Council of Ministers is normally blocked by West Germany, 
Britain and the Netherlands. The EC therefore tried in the Tokyo round 
to enforce an amendment of Article XIX of the GATT which would en­
able importers to act unequivocally and selectively against ‘disruptive im­
ports’, meaning imports from new suppliers. The EC claimed this to be a 
requirement for the acceptance of the rest of the Tokyo round, but the 
threat was not pursued in the end. Now, antidumping has enabled the 
Commission to acquire what it did not get in the Tokyo round.
As reported by Messerlin (1987 and 1989), the EC antidumping law 
has progressively given rise to trade measures inconsistent with GATT, 
and the impact has been severe. The policy is administered by an office 
within the Commission with a political ‘appeal court’ that belongs to the 
Executive rather than the Legislative Branch. In contrast to Article XIX, 
which does not allow discrimination between countries, antidumping pro­
ceedings are concerned with companies. Hindley (1988, 1989) and Palme- 
ter (1989) show that practically any exporter can be found guilty of 
dumping. A bias appears both because of the calculation principles, and of 
the way they are used.
When calculating a market reference price at home, the EC Commis­
sion supposedly looks for the average, but gives itself the right to neglect 
certain domestic prices. Concerning export prices the Commission sys­
tematically neglects those that are above the home market reference price, 
arguing that ‘negative dumping’ has no legal existence, and treating these 
export prices as if they had been at the reference price. If prices have the 
same mean and spread abroad as in the home market, the principle of dis­





























































































Between 1980 and 1986, the EC decided on 213 affirmative cases of 
antidumping, many of which touched only narrowly defined goods (Fin­
ger and Olechowski, 1987). The seriousness cannot be judged on the basis 
of the number of cases, however, but hinges on the linkage to VERs. It is 
commonly argued that the firms targeted are based in countries that use 
discriminatory trade policies themselves. The prime reason is hardly 
protective barriers at home, but rather the absence of readiness to agree 
to VERs, which is clearly seen from the cases made against Hong Kong.
An exporter informed that he is suspected of dumping generally faces 
an easy choice. Either he avoids problems by raising prices, acquiring a 
higher profit margin but suffering reduced sales, or he goes through a 
costly legal process, the outcome of which is more or less predetermined. 
Subsequent to the verdict the firm cannot expect a higher profit per unit 
on its remaining sales but must count on a duty. Messerlin (1989) reports 
that antidumping measures have reduced imported quantities by 40 per 
cent three years after the initiation of the investigations, and that the av­
erage ad valorem equivalent has been about 23 per cent.
As discussed in Andersson (1989), the pressure for protectionism may 
intensify as the Single market is realized. Domestic firms squeezed by in­
creased competition from other EC countries are tempted to seek com­
pensation in the form of external protection. The abolition of subsidies in 
defence of competitors within the EC will make funds available for dis­
crimination of outsiders over the budget. While external competition 
hurts many producers, it is mainly consumers that benefit from it. The 
former tend to be relatively well organized and apt to achieve political 
leverage, while the latter often have little to say.
Japan, the Asian NIEs and the East Asian countries following their 
trail are particularly likely targets of discrimination in the EC by 1992. 
The EC-Asian trade is imbalanced in favour of East Asia, and it is less 
important for the EC than for Asia as it comprises a much smaller share 
of total trade for the former. The declining applicability of GATT and 
the most-favoured-nation principle enables protectionism against East 
Asia specifically. Summing up some of the arguments already made in 
this and the preceding chapter, and adding a few points, the following 
factors might favour a discrimination in the EC of imports from East 
Asia:
i) Irrespective of 1992, the need of the U.S. to achieve balance in its 
external trade will exert a continuous downward pressure on the 
dollar.12 The Asian NIEs, with their currencies tied to the dollar and 
their concentration on the U.S. market, are forced to diversify their 
exports away from it, while the European market is becoming more 
lucrative. As import quotas in the EC are filled, Asian exports will
12 In the short run, this may naturally be overshadowed by changes in consumer behaviour, shifts in in- 




























































































appear increasingly threatening and the demand for protectionism 
against them will increase.
ii) Protectionist measures which can effectively be used selectively 
against imports are already available in the EC. This may put protec­
tionists in the favourable position of merely preserving the prevailing 
order, while the burden of overturning it will rest with the advocates 
of liberalization.
iii) The French government, which has advocated raised external protec­
tion as the interior is reduced, has gained support by the added mem­
bership to the EC of Greece, Spain and Portugal. Countries with less 
advanced industries are generally most adverse towards competition, 
and the newcomers in the EC have a lot to gain from preventing an 
increase in imports from Asia in e.g. leather, footwear, textiles, 
clothing, and steel. As pointed out in connection to Figure 2, EC im­
ports from developing countries have shifted the most towards Asia, 
with Europe (in this case including Spain and Portugal) in the second 
place.
iv) When the internal barriers to trade, such as Article 115, are abol­
ished and pressure builds up for ‘inner-liberalization compensating’ 
protection against third countries, North America and EFTA are in a 
relatively stronger bargaining position than Japan and the developing 
countries. As noted, East Asian countries are the most likely targets 
among the developing countries.
In the financial markets, universal banking is set to prevail throughout 
the EC, and the “erga omnes” principle aims at extending the liberali­
zation to all countries worldwide. It is true that the so-called “reciprocity 
clause” of the second banking directive requires the same access for EC 
banks abroad, which is believed to have speeded the establishment of 
American and Japanese subsidiaries in Europe before 1993 (when it 
becomes effective). Financial liberalization may also have been stimulated 
in the US and Japan, but it was unquestionably coming anyway. The risk 
of discrimination is relatively small in the financial markets, partly 
because the ethnical, cultural and political barriers will remain in Europe. 
In financial services, the problems of acquiring information and coping 
with monitoring costs strongly favour those that are incumbent in a 
market. The establishment of a single currency union and a common 
central bank should do away with the exchange rate instability within the 
EC and, hence, make Europe more accessible for outsiders. There are 
still problems with the design of an optimal monetary policy in the 
heterogeneous Community, however, and it remains uncertain how 
quickly the member states are wil ing to move in this field. In any case, 
customized relations rather than discrimination will remain the major 





























































































4.8 The Viability o f EC Protectionism
The risk of protectionism in the EC will probably be much influenced by 
the degree to which the 1992 program turns out to be beneficial for the 
EC itself. Given that the envisaged mobility in investment and labour 
diminishes the pockets of idle resources that today exist within the EC, 
the support for protectionism will decline. It should also be stressed that 
Germany, the economic giant in the EC, is a firm opponent of protection­
ism. The stronger Germany becomes, the more difficult it will be to turn 
the EC onto a protectionist trail.
Even to the extent that the protectionists would prevail over the free 
traders, it must be asked whether EC protectionism represents a ‘viable’ 
strategy to keep East Asian producers out from the Single Market. For a 
number of reasons, the probable answer to this question is ‘no’. For ex­
ample, a reduced percentage of sales of the average firm can be protected 
in a global economy, but export markets cannot be protected. In a more 
complex system it is increasingly likely that the sheltering of one pro­
ducer hurts another one downstream. Controls of steel imports will dam­
age automobile factories, tariffs on chips will raise costs for computer 
manufacturers, and so on. Hence, the costs of protectionism will ulti­
mately be felt intensely by producers as well, not only be spread thin over 
a mass of unsuspecting consumers.
Protectionist measures in the EC also have the effect, already highly 
visible, of stimulating inward direct investment. By qualifying as insiders, 
foreign firms thereby hope to be able to price and sell freely within the 
Single Market. The last few years have seen an expansion of direct invest­
ment, particularly from Japan, reaching about U.S. $6 billion in 1987. 
Table 18 shows that the Japanese direct investment used to focus almost 
entirely on the U.K., but that it has become much more spread over many 
countries over recent years. The projects established are completely for­
eign owned, focus on activities in which they have a marked technological 
advantage vis-à-vis European firms, and tend to produce for several of 
the national markets. Most investments have gone to service industries, 
including finance and insurance, and electrical and transport equipment. 
The Japanese are followed most notably by the Koreans, who are plan­
ning to double their number of trading and manufacturing operations in 
the EC by 1992, according to Far Eastern Economic Review (1989).
With protectionism creating vested interests, which thrive in the ab­
sence of foreign competition and give rise to the kinds of costs discussed 
in the previous chapter, inward direct investment becomes a valuable 
substitute for free trade from the perspective of the recipient country. 
Because the EC consists of historically and culturally sovereign nations, 
one can expect competition between the individual members for the at­
traction of direct investment. Such competition has been observed be­





























































































The more effective the external protectionism of the EC becomes, the 
more desirable direct investment, and the more fierce the competition 
between the individual EC countries will become. It can, of course, be 
expected that the EC countries will seek to coordinate their polices with 
regard to inward investment, but such coordination has proved difficult 
in practice. There has not yet been much interest in discussing harmo­
nization of tax rates, for example. In any case, protectionism coupled 
with demands for stringency against foreign investors would create 
strong incentives for the individual member countries to cheat on the 
collective. The resulting tensions could threaten to tear the EC apart from 
the inside. Disputes over the location of Japanese car manufacturing in the 
U.K. have already entered into Brussels. At the same time, the Danes, the 
Irish or the Dutch are not eager to pay more for Japanese cars in order to 
permit the French and the Italians to avoid adjustments.
The EC countries do counter the undertaking of direct investments 
through imposition of taxes or various performance requirements, such 
as local content rules. The latter force foreign firms to buy a certain pro­
portion of their input locally. Again due to their heterogeneity, however, 
it is unlikely that die EC countries will be able to agree to policies which 
lead to any strong deterrence of inward direct investment. Direct invest­
ment will most likely continue to flow freely into the EC, and escape with 
a good deal of the rents created by a possible spurt in protectionism.
There is an additional set of factors which may make discriminatory 
trade and investment policies in the EC costly for the EC itself. These 
concern the importance of the East Asian markets in future business ac­
tivities. A closed EC market will allow European firms to continue their 
neglect of East Asia.
There can be little doubt that a long term commitment is necessary if 
efforts to break into the Japanese markets are to be successful. Even if 
there are fewer trade barriers than is usually alleged, there are great ob­
stacles and high costs associated with market entry. A powerful language 
barrier, alien business and cultural practices, high land costs, the multi­
layer distribution system, and high costs of living, particularly for expa­
triates, and so on, could mean a long stretch of years before any eco­
nomic rewards materialize. Still, foreign firms which have managed to 
establish themselves in the Japanese market are often exceptionally prof­
itable. East Asians are careful with product quality and enjoy stable and 
reliable business relationships. In order to share in the future growth of 
the region, it is high time to be active there today already.
The price to pay for not moving ahead into Japan could cancel out all 
other receipts for additional reasons. Success in East Asia today may well 
be necessary for the future ability to withstand the business strategies of 
Japanese and other East Asian firms in Europe as well as in other mar­
kets. Japanese firms tend to compete fiercely among themselves within 
their home market before they go abroad, and then move more or less 




























































































followed by the Koreans and the Taiwanese, are expanding their business 
activities throughout the huge and rapidly growing markets in East Asia. 
The threatened closure of the U.S. market, and the doubts of the future 
openness of the EC, make this emphasis on Asia even more desirable 
from a Japanese viewpoint. Through this, the Japanese further enhance 
their efficiency when exploiting international differences in factor costs 
and access to natural resources.
We have already suggested that a solid position at home is the basis for 
Japanese corporations abroad. Those foreign firms which have managed 
to withstand competition abroad most successfully are often precisely 
those which have weathered it in Japan already. Tetra Pak of Sweden is 
one example, Abegglen and Stalk (1985) name others. As discussed by 
them, the failure of foreign firms to take advantage of the many oppor­
tunities that prevail in Japan is largely due to ignorance and a curious 
disinterest. If not only Japan but also the rapidly growing East Asian re­
gion as a whole is left to be dominated by Japanese firms, they will have 
an even stronger basis to start out from the day they decide to launch an 
attack on the Single Market anyway.
It can be concluded that the opportunities of creating the Single Market 
should outweigh the fears of a ‘fortification’ of Europe through taxes or 
NTBs. That is, the fears should subside with the realization that such 
‘armaments’ would be costly not only for outsiders, but much more so 
for Europe itself. If nations and international bodies are ‘rational’, the EC 
should be an open market place.
5. A European Asian Agenda
5.1 The European Agenda
The European agenda is massive. Most attention so far has been paid to 
the creation of the Single Market, with all its remaining difficulties. The 
struggle to accommodate the EFTA countries, whether through member­
ship or the achievement of a functioning EES, poses additional problems. 
The reconstruction and affiliation of Eastern Europe constitutes an even 
more formidable challenge. Some might say that the difficulties must be 
tackled one at a time. The different matters are interrelated, however, 
and must be dealt with within one context.
The difficulties of handling all these issues must not obscure the im­
portance of the European policy vis-à-vis East Asia. The previous chap­
ters have suggested a severe underexploitation of potentially valuable op­
portunities for trade and investment between these two regions. One of 
the regions is the most dynamic that exists; the other is about to form the 
world’s largest single market through an unprecedented phasing out of 




























































































emerge as a major factor in the shaping of rules for trade and investment 
world wide over the coming decades.
The present situation makes it necessary for Europe to develop a better 
planned and more imaginative East Asian Policy. The reason is not the 
least that Europe itself is very much on the East Asian agenda. As can be 
seen in Table 19, the share of exports from the Asian-Pacific region go­
ing to Europe was at a high of 24.7 per cent in 1960, compared to only 
18.5 per cent to the U.S. In 1985, these figures were reversed to only 
13.7 per cent going to Europe and 29.5 per cent to the U.S. In the last 
few years, Europe has again become an important target for East Asian 
exports, while the share going to the U.S. is diminishing.
East Asia is currently expanding and reorienting its trade and invest­
ment activities, partly in the European direction. While the East Asians 
consequently are busily preparing to benefit from the European market, 
the Europeans are so engaged in creating it -  and using it -  that they do 
not have enough time to learn how to exploit the East Asian opportuni­
ties. This means that the already large imbalances in trade and investment 
between the regions will most likely become even bigger. In this situation 
it is not acceptable for Europe to sit back and focus on its own problems, 
postponing the matter of forming its relationship with other regions, par­
ticularly East Asia.
5.2 Demands on a European Agenda for East Asia
The relationship between Europe and East Asia is partly a matter of atti­
tudes. For example, it is not quite as difficult to export to or invest suc­
cessfully in Japan as is often said. Japanese firms tend to view the other 
East Asian markets as highly stable and safe, while European firms often 
view them as highly uncertain. Still, Europeans typically enjoy a great 
deal of good-will in East Asia compared to the Japanese.
Japan-bashing has the opposite effect of preventing Westerners from 
looking for opportunities for business. While many Americans more or 
less in panic call for a closing out of Japanese interests, some Europeans 
take the equally dangerous and unwise viewpoint that ‘what goes up, must 
come down’. Behind such a relaxed attitude lies some kind of belief that 
the Europeans will become notably stronger with the completion of the 
Single Market in Europe by 1992, and/or that it will be possible to close 
out the Asians from the market. As seen in the previous chapter, how­
ever, outsiders will also benefit from the completion of the single market 
in the absence of increased external protectionism, and it is highly doubt­
ful whether there is any consistent and effective policy which can close 
them out. There is, in any case, no such policy which is favourable for 
social welfare in the European Community itself.
The attitudes that prevail in Europe today give rise to far too many 
misapprehensions and easy excuses for not trying to export and invest 




























































































‘It is increasingly clear that the development of European exports to 
Japan depends as much on the interest of Community companies in the 
market as on the removal of trade barriers.’
Actions under a European agenda for East Asia should, at the least, 
fulfill the following demands:
a) Strengthen the European economy by fully exploiting trade and for­
eign investment opportunities in East Asia.
b) Promote good relations with the increasingly important East Asian 
countries and make it possible to avoid friction with East Asia.
c) Help to preserve a liberal world economic order which would mean 
good opportunities for free trade and capital movements.
d) Allow policies which facilitate growth of the developing countries in 
Asia and elsewhere.
e) Create the basis for cooperation concerning common resource issues, 
such as a sound management of the oceans and the atmosphere.
5.3 Multiple Levels
A European agenda for East Asia, and its specific design and implemen­
tation, is not a simple matter. First of all, it must be devised on many dif­
ferent levels. Trade and investments between two regions as disparate in 
institutional and cultural conditions and geographical distance as Europe 
and East Asia are not an isolated phenomenon. On the contrary, the suc­
cess of such activities is critically dependent on a satisfactory level of in­
formation about what business opportunities are available and how to ap­
proach them in an effective manner.
Hence, progress is likely to require increased economic relations be­
tween the regions in general terms. The task of remedying the presently 
low level of knowledge about East Asia in Europe lies especially heavily 
on the universities. These must set up research and teaching programs 
which make coming generations of policy makers and business people 
more apt to make good use of opportunities in East Asia. Still, the actual 
work of exploiting trade and investment opportunities, and in the process 
minimizing the causes and costs of frictions, must ultimately be taken care 
of by private corporations. These firms must also implement incentive 
programs which make it possible for employees to engage actively in 
work with East Asia. Their support, or pressure for, research and educa­
tional programs on the region may also be necessary to achieve a satisfac­
tory scale and quality in such programs.
European governments also have a role to play in the context of 
spurring an optimal amount of information on a distant region like East 
Asia. In more general terms, governments are in a position to facilitate an 
efficient functioning of business activities across national boundaries, not 
least by removal of their own obstacles to well-functioning international 
markets (as in the case of the bureaucratic obstacles to trade within the 




























































































vate business activities that ensure an optimal management of common re­
sources.
5.4 Items on a European Agenda for East Asia
There are many items on a European agenda on East Asia. The purpose 
of this section is to suggest some of those which we regard as most im­
portant. We bring up the following:
a) Provision of information
First of all, it is necessary to acquire a much better knowledge of and ac­
cess to information on the European -  East Asian relationship. This in­
cludes the provision of data on the nature of the gravity shift that has 
taken place from the Atlantic to the Pacific, the nature (including oppor­
tunities and risks) of the new markets that have appeared in East Asia, 
and the characteristics and consequences of the new competition offered 
by East Asian firms. All these matters should be more extensively studied 
from a European viewpoint. The goal must be to facilitate a more con­
structive approach to East Asia among policy makers, business people and 
academics in Europe.
b) A more lively dialogue and better forums for contacts
Not only do we need improved information, but livelier contacts between 
the regions are necessary to stimulate European exports and investments 
in East Asia. The U.S. has cooperated with Japan and East Asia for a long 
time in many forums for government officials, business people, and aca­
demics. As contacts have been created this way, there is a greater under­
standing of the various opportunities as well as the friction in the interac­
tion between the regions. The problem in the U.S. is rather the low level 
of education and knowledge among the population in general, which is 
typically below that in Europe. At present, the U.S. has much more fric­
tion with Japan and some of the NIEs than Europe has, but it is still a fact 
that the U.S. has managed to develop more intensive trade and investment 
contacts with the region. The following forums are examples of U.S.- 
East Asian contacts:
-  The Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), which was formed in 
1967, brings together business leaders for annual conferences. Its aim 
is to ‘improve business environments, strengthen the business enter­
prise system, generate new business opportunities, create new business 
relationships, and increase trade and investment within the Pacific 
Basin area’.
-  The Pacific Free Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD), 





























































































— Since the early 1980s, a series of annual Pacific Economic Coopera­
tion Conferences (PECC) has brought together government officials 
in a private capacity, as well as representatives of the academic and 
business sectors, for policy-oriented discussions.
-  In 1989, the initiative was taken to upgrade the political level of Pa­
cific meetings in order to make it possible to set up a forum for min­
isterial meetings as well.
Even if geographical and political factors, not to speak of govern­
mental organizations, make it difficult to find the same ground for re­
gular meetings and conferences involving Europeans and East Asians as 
in the Pacific, an effort should be made to set up Eurasian organizations 
and meeting places. After all, the flight time from Washington to Tokyo 
is longer than that from Berlin or Stockholm to Tokyo, and about the 
same as from Brussels to Tokyo.
The EC could assist in the formation of such initiatives. Politicians and 
bureaucrats have an interest in an expanded dialogue. Academics in Eu­
rope who have had typically little contact with East Asia, and business 
people who often have little experience from this region, would certainly 
benefit from improved contacts.
The EC, it should be noted, mns a Center for Industrial Cooperation in 
Tokyo together with the Japanese. The intention is to improve the possi­
bilities for EC business people to acquaint themselves with the Japanese 
economy. The EC also operates an Executive Training programme, under 
which it finances an 18 month period in Japan for young executives. 
Given the great need, however, these efforts represent too little interac­
tion.
c) Integration
The creation of the Single Market in the EC will, if properly managed, 
strengthen the economic capacity of Europe and European firms. The 
creation of the Single Market will certainly enable greater advantages to 
scale in European production. More importantly, however, there must be 
an upgraded level of competition in Europe if technical progress and in­
novation are to catch up.
The fact is that a successful 1992 program is much needed to make the 
Europeans better equipped to take advantage of new markets as well as 
counter the new competition from East Asia. This requires, however, that 
intensified competition is not prevented by either governments or the 
strategic behaviour of large firms. At present, governments and compa­
nies alike seem to favour mergers, cartel building and extensive collabo­
ration between firms as measures to counteract the expected burst in 
competition before it has even emerged. This tendency is potentially dan­
gerous and a reappraisal of antitrust attitudes and policies will be neces­




























































































The level of competition within the EC will ultimately be strongly in­
fluenced by the EC’s external policy. Concerning the European countries 
still outside the EC, the creation of a functioning EES is presently a mat­
ter of high priority. In order to have not only access to the Single Market 
but also a say concerning its features, however, we have already implied 
that these countries may have little choice but to become members of the 
Community. As members, countries such as Sweden and Norway would 
also lend support to an open external policy for the Community as a 
whole.
Europe needs a successful integration of the Common Market itself as 
well as of the markets of the neighbouring European economies. Even 
more than that, however, it needs an open Community.
d) An open trade policy
An open trade policy will serve Europe’s interests in its relations with 
East Asia and Japan much better than a closed one. To make a fortress of 
the Single Market would counteract the expected favourable impact of the 
1992 program. Merging and/or collaborating huge European firms would 
share the profits of the vast market. At the same time they would be 
sheltered from pressure for dynamic changes, prices would be allowed to 
remain high, and the European firms would be even more confident to 
refrain from expanding their activities in other regions, including East 
Asia.
The argument brought forward in favour of protection is, of course, 
that it will be used to provide assistance in the short run only. Typically, 
however, those accorded the privilege of subsidy -  management as well as 
labour -  in order to acquire a longer time for adjustment, begin to think 
that adjustment may not be necessary at all. Firms forming cartels with 
their present competitors may similarly start thinking that they can avoid 
competition. When foreign competition comes -  as it inevitably does -  
those lured to believe that they can stay away from it will be particularly 
badly prepared.
Moreover, we have argued that the EC is a heterogeneous organiza­
tion, consisting of individual nations. For these reasons, external protec­
tionism would be likely to set up centrifugal forces which would threaten 
to tear the EC apart from the inside, at least until the integration process 
has reached a stage where national considerations, as we know them now, 
have disappeared. The problems are illustrated by the difficulties of de­
vising a policy for trade in cars produced through direct investment 
within the Single Market. Should there be local content rules -  and could 
there be without creating substantial problems? And could import obsta­
cles be raised against cars produced by Japanese factories in the U.S., for 
example? It can be noted that the U.S., in trade disputes with the EC, has 





























































































Finally, we have observed U.S. protectionist movements. Experiencing 
a decline in its relative international power and faced with macro-eco­
nomic imbalances, it is likely that the U.S. will continue to reduce its sup­
port of principles of free trade -  which has been one of the foundations 
of post-war growth world wide. Under such circumstances it is of great 
importance that a self-confident Europe provides the leadership which is 
needed to preserve an open world economic system. Whether this will 
actually be the case hinges mostly on the European stance against East 
Asia, which is the only region with which the EC now experiences large 
trade deficits.
e) Macro-economic policies for competitiveness
An open trade policy must be combined with macro-economic policies 
which support economic stability and competitive cost levels. We have 
seen that deficits usually set up protectionist pressures. Rather than serv­
ing as a cure, however, protection tends rather to aggravate them by 
slowing growth as the pressure for raised productivity is mitigated. To 
borrow a comment from George Stigler: ‘the bad thing about depressions 
is not that people starve, but that they think badly’. The same is true for 
trade deficits.
If, as currently in the U.S., total output is lower than the absorption of 
resources through investment and consumption, the difference must come 
from the rest of the world, and is reflected in a deficit in the current ac­
count. This is unavoidably so as long as this savings deficit prevails. Such 
imbalances must be corrected through macro-economic policy changes in 
the country with the deficit or surplus. A coordination of macro-eco­
nomic policies within Europe may be helpful in preventing a repetition of 
the U.S. development. The reason is that coordination provides scope for 
the implementation of effective measures throughout countries. On the 
other hand, there must be a defence against centrifugal forces exerting a 
pressure for various kinds of ‘compensations’, an excessive amount of 
which would worsen the prospects for sound macro-economic policies. 
Addressing these issues is not least necessary for the adoption of a com­
mon currency, and a credible monetary policy by a central bank for the 
European Community.13
f) Pressures to ‘open Japan’
To put pressure on protectionist markets to open up may be a construc­
tive exercise. It must not, however, be used as a means of protecting one’s 
own market. Our experience, notably with the antidumping policy in the 
EC, shows that this easily becomes the case. The machinery for exerting
13 A central bank for the EC was proposed by the Delors Report (1989). As foreseen by the central 




























































































pressure on another country, in this case Japan, must be explicitly de­
signed so as not to serve as a temptation for implementation of trade bar­
riers at home.
It should be conceded that Japan, and certainly South Korea and Tai­
wan among the Asian NIEs, still operate NTBs which ought to be elimi­
nated. In addition, there are detrimental DTBs as a result of government 
policies as well as corporate practices. Unlike taxes and NTBs, DTBs do 
not systematically switch domestic expenditure away from imports. In­
stead, they affect the functioning of the domestic economy, and often re­
duce its efficiency. Thus, their removal will first and foremost make the 
liberalizing country more competitive. It would facilitate the access of 
goods, services, and investment in general, including those provided from 
abroad.
If structural impediments such as the Japanese multi-layer distribution 
system could be eliminated, much capital and labour could be freed to 
enter the automobile, home electronics, and computer industries. This is 
not to say that Europe, or the U.S., should cease to press for the break up 
of structural impediments, as access to the Japanese market would be bet­
ter for everybody -  foreign as well as Japanese producers. The effect will 
be even greater prospects for trade in both directions, and this is there­
fore what we should expect.
It may still be argued that there are particular aspects of Japanese bar­
riers to trade which need to be subject to foreign pressure purely for the 
sake of abolishing the discrimination of foreigners. One relates to the re­
ception of new technologies in Japan. The task of investing in R&D 
hinges on the expectation that ‘monopoly’ rents can be captured swiftly, 
before the new knowledge has permeated to competitors. The introduc­
tion and distribution of goods, which are ‘new’ due to innovations or dis­
coveries which have temporarily provided its producer with an economic 
edge, in many instances seem particularly difficult in Japan. When a de­
laying boycott against the spread of new products can save the Japanese 
from dissolving rents to foreigners, there appears to be a different game 
going on compared to most other countries. Domestic company groups, 
with overt or covert support by public institutions, may block the goods 
until they can launch their own variant and get ahead in the Japanese 
market.
Cases with this kind of unfair competition may not be easy to identify, 
but the task requires a close and focused observation of the Japanese mar­
ket. This is where the EC should put in its resources, so as to support the 
same option for its own firms to launch new products in Japan as Japanese 
firms should have in Europe. Requiring abolition of trade barriers in 
Japan with respect to a product such as foreign cars makes no sense, since 
foreign firms have no competitive edge in this product any longer. Rather 
than following the American quest for sweeping structural reforms, it 
may be better to pinpoint the specific cases when unfair competition can 




























































































immediate change as a condition for the introduction of new products by 
Japanese corporations in the Single Market.
It should be noted that Japanese business groups do practice various 
strategies which may effectively prevent foreigners from succeeding in 
the introduction of new goods in Japan. As described by Abegglen and 
Stalk (1985), for example, they may seem to turn a blind eye while a 
foreign firm launches a costly marketing campaign which opens up a new 
consumer interest. Once this has been done, the Japanese run in with close 
substitutes which are priced at the lowest possible level, capitalizing on 
the marketing expenses of the foreign firm and quickly ousting it from 
the market. This kind of strategy may not seem ‘nice’, but it is not unfair 
in any legal sense, and the Japanese are certainly not alone in this case of 
behaviour -  they are only better organized and informed at times. Such 
strategies should not be countered by trade policies, but by improved 
contacts and stronger ties between Japan and Europe.
g) Corporate strategies
As previously stated, governments and business people in East Asia today 
pay a great deal of attention to Europe. For several reasons, it is vital for 
European firms to devise and implement corporate strategies which ex­
ploit the opportunities that prevail in East Asia more consistently. Japan 
and other East Asian countries are already large and profitable markets 
for many European firms. Still, they continue to attract fairly scant inter­
est in European headquarters.
As was dealt with in the previous chapter, neglecting to enter East Asia 
today raises the risk for an overwhelming assault by East Asian firms at 
home tomorrow. Leaving East Asia to Japan would provide this country 
with an even larger and more rapidly growing base to serve as a solid 
preparation ground for further expansions. As an answer, European 
firms must not seek protection, but rather develop their operations in 
East Asia on a long-term basis, and let the incentives to do so transcend 
their own organizations.
Against this background, it must be recommended that European firms 
take an active part in the studying of long term business strategies of 
Japanese and other East Asian firms. The many success stories of foreign 
exporters and investors -  including American ones -  should be studied. 
Skills relevant for the East Asian markets should be cultivated. Trainee 
systems could be formed to provide insights into East Asian business sys­
tems, strategies and markets. A business experience from East Asia could 
be given special merit value for young executives in their careers. Market 
studies and other efforts which usually precede exports and direct invest­
ment could be directed towards better ascertaining the opportunities in 
East Asia. It may be possible to recruit influential Japanese and other East 
Asians to sit on the board of the mother corporation of truly global 




























































































h) Cooperation rather than confrontation
When there are different and partly conflicting interests it may seem that 
there is no reason not to advocate one’s own position. Economic transac­
tions and contracts do not generally amount to a zero sum game. Typi­
cally, both parties profit from agreements which can be made freely. This 
is the basic argument why free trade and open competition is in every­
body’s interest, and why fierce competition between firms should not be 
counteracted. At the same time, there are instances when the outcome of 
economic activities can be improved by regulations that are marked by 
cooperative solutions on an overriding level. A topical example is that of 
common resources, which tend to be public goods. The expansion of in­
dustrial activities and the growing human population have in recent 
decades increasingly burdened the global environment. It has become 
more and more evident that the lack of property rights, concerning e.g. 
clean air and water, prevents an optimal management of our natural re­
source base by the functioning of free markets.14 Some of the most seri­
ous problems arise because resources are commonly used by different 
nations which have their own legislations.
A country whose emissions damage another country would account for 
the whole cost of pollution abatement, but not reap all the benefits. The 
same may hold for a country which has a financial incentive to exploit, 
and deplete, its biological diversity. This reduces the willingness to cut 
emissions or the level of exploitation to the level which would be desir­
able from a global perspective. Likewise, the possibility of polluters to 
move activities abroad may diminish a country’s ability to cut down on 
emissions. The ‘polluter pays’ principle, which is generally accepted in 
theory, is in practice an ineffective instrument to achieve an optimal level 
of pollution abatement or natural preservation across countries. Among 
the consequences can be mentioned: the risk of a thinning of the earth’s 
ozone layer, global warming, acidification in Europe and North America, 
the devastation of tropical rain forests, etc. In the case of chlorofluoro- 
carbons (CFCs), which are reported to damage the ozone layer, develop­
ing countries like India and China require substantial compensations for 
replacing CFCs with substitutes in new industries. These countries see 
themselves as carrying a disproportionate share of the financial burden 
caused by a stop to the use of CFCs.
The appreciation of environmental values tends to be higher in devel­
oped countries, such as Japan and those in Western Europe. These have 
fairly crowded, well educated and relatively well-off populations in 
common. It is also here that we find the most extensive legislations for
14As with protectionism in goods and services, the costs of excessive pollution are carried by the large 
number of 'ordinary consumers', while the profits tend to be reaped by a small number of relatively well- 




























































































environmental protection. Partly due to the proximity of Eastern Europe, 
the EC is now aware of the need for international solutions to environ­
mental problems. Japan is similarly close to heavily polluted younger in­
dustrial nations, and has announced an ambition to adopt a leading posi­
tion in regard to international environmental problems.
Instituting a sound management of the environment will take the ability 
to develop and implement mechanisms which confront economic actors 
world wide with effective incentives to achieve the total emissions which 
are acceptable from a global view point. It will take a good deal of flex­
ibility to find solutions which are generally acceptable. There can be little 
doubt that an open world economy will be conducive to finding such so­
lutions. Still, getting the results will require someone’s initiative and lead­
ership. As in the case of trade policies, the U.S. is resuming a defensive 
position with its decline in competitiveness, which was demonstrated e.g. 
at the Bergen Conference (May 8th -  16th 1990) of the ECE countries on 
the global environment. Led by European countries, and struggling not to 
have the U.S. boycott the outcome, the conference agreed only on a weak 
commitment to strive for reduced CO2 emissions.
Major reductions in CO2 emissions will require multi-million invest­
ments in new equipment and technology. A joint commitment in Europe 
and Japan to lead the way would open up a new area for mutually benefi­
cial exchange between the regions. So far, however, their ambitions have 
not gone much beyond words. Japan and the EC are, for example, the 
dominating importers of tropical timber, the careless extraction of which 
causes excessive deforestation in developing countries. Of the 33 nations 
currently exporting tropical timber products, only 10 will have any forest 
left in ten years time according to the Economist (1989). The loss of bio­
logical diversity and climatic stability which goes with this destmction in­
curs losses on all humanity.
i) Upgrading of European universities
Typically, the major U.S. universities have high powered Centers on 
Japanese and East Asian studies. No university in Europe has good insti­
tutions of this type. This is a major weakness which, if unrepaired, will 
inevitably put Europe at a disadvantage in interactions with East Asia. 
Universities and schools in Europe must therefore conduct research and 
develop their curricula so as to make it possible for the next generation to 
acquire a better understanding of East Asia in general.
The quality of the human work force is a major competitive power in 
today’s technically and economically sophisticated world. Such quality, 
including the level of knowledge, adaptability and flexibility, is partly a 
matter of the overall educational level. Here, Europe today has an edge 
over the U.S., which is lagging behind as far as the general public is con­
cerned. The Japanese are farther ahead still, however, and the Koreans 




























































































competition of highly skilled work forces in East Asia it is essential that 
European universities rise to new standards. The educational systems in 
Europe are in a relatively good position for a revitalization, but there is a 
need to advance the top universities, as well as improve schools in gen­
eral.
6. Summary
The categorization of a first, a second and a third world has become ob­
solete. The second no longer exists, the third is breaking apart as East 
Asian dynamism enables some countries to break out of the trap of un­
derdevelopment, and the first world has lost its economic dominance. Se­
curity issues are no longer at the immediate core of the international 
agenda, but the focus is shifting towards economic issues.
What should be a European agenda for East Asia? It has been argued 
that the root of East Asian dynamism lies in an actively pursued export- 
oriented development strategy. There has been a demonstration effect on 
the rest of the world, and new opportunities as well as risks have 
emerged. Protectionism has been spurred, most markedly in the U.S., 
which is giving up its position as champion of free trade. There is also a 
fear of non-tariff barriers to imports and domestic trade barriers 
throughout the developed countries. On the other hand, there has been a 
demonstration effect of super-gains from trade, the planned economies 
are opening up and seeking a change of their systems, and there are 
strong tendencies towards regional integration, particularly in the EC.
While the relationship between Europe and East Asia is underex­
ploited, it is now at the core of which way the world economy is going. 
Japanese and other East Asian firms are taking major steps to increase 
their activities in Europe. The Europeans, on the other hand, are preoc­
cupied with their own restructuring, and pay little attention to the 
economies in East Asia -  which are the most expansive in the world.
Against this background, it is highly likely that the already large trade 
and investment imbalances between Europe and East Asia will widen. In 
spite of the promises that have been made, such a situation poses a risk of 
a closing of the European market against goods from East Asia. Such a 
‘fortification’ should not be in the interest of the Europeans themselves. 
Since export markets cannot be protected and direct investment would en­
able the outsiders to divide and conquer the EC from the inside, it is 
hardly possible to close them out. The cost of trying would be particu­
larly high as protectionism would allow European firms to remain inac­
tive in East Asia. Those firms tin t effectively counter the Japanese in 
their own market are often those that have got to know them in Japan. 
Leaving the expanding markets of East Asia to be dominated by Japanese 





























































































To enable a sound and mutually beneficial interaction between the re­
gions, it is important for Europe to design a more inspired agenda for 
East Asia as soon as possible. This paper concludes with a number of 
items for such an agenda. These must be devised on many levels and 
stimulate a change in attitudes on the part of politicians, business people 
and academics. The points brought up relate to the provision of informa­
tion on East Asia, a livelier dialogue between the regions, better forums 
for contacts, a successful integration of the EC which results in more 
fierce competition between firms, an open trade policy in the EC against 
outside countries, sound macro-economic policies, some pressures to 
‘open Japan’, corporate strategies which enable greater success in East 
Asia, cooperation rather than confrontation concerning common re­






















































































































































































APPENDIX: TABLES A 1
Table 1




















Japan 122 378 2,376 15,760 59.8
Korea 42 98 121 2,690 3.0
Taiwan 20 36 91 4,990 0.3
Hong Kong 6 1 36 8,070 0.9
Singapore 3 1 20 7,940 0.5
Malaysia 16 330 31 1,810 0.8
Thailand 54 514 48 850 1.2
Indonesia 171 1,905 70 450 1.8
Brunei 0.3 6 4 15,390 0.1
Philippines 58 300 34 590 0.8
Papua New 
Guinea
4 462 3 700 0.1
Australia 16 7,687 183 11,100 4.6
New Zealand 3 269 32 7,750 0.8
China 1,068 9,561 293 290 7.4
U.S. Pacific 37 2,368 628 14,690 15.8
States
Sources: World Development Report, World Bank; Republic of China; 



























































































Shares of Various Asian-Pacific Groups and Groupings and of the 
United States, Europe (OECD), and Non-Asian-Pacific Basin Less 
Developed Countries (LDCs) in World Population, Area and Income f 
(excl.USSR and East Europe)
Table 2
Population Area GDP
Mill. Per cent 1000 Per cent Bill. Per cent
1987 of world sq. km. of world USD of world
total total 1987 total
Japan 122 2.6 378 0.4 2,378 16.0
N.E. Asia 190 4.1 513 0.5 2,624 17.7
ASEAN 303 6.5 3,056 3.1 207 1.4
S. Pacific 20 0.4 8,418 8.7 19,550 1.5
Asian NICs 71 
Asian-Pacific
1.5 136 1.4 268 1.8
LDCs (exkl 
China) 375 8.1 3,653 3.8 458 3.1
Asian-Pacific
region 516 11.1 11,987 12.4 3,049 20.5
China 1,068 
U.S. Pacific
23.1 9,561 9.9 293 2.0
states 37 0.8 2,386 2.5 629 4.2
Total Pacific
Basin 1,621 35.0 23,934 24.7 3,971 26.7
U.S. 244 5.3 9,373 9.7 4,497 30.3
Europe
(OECD) 408 8.8 4,269 4.4 4,791 32.2
Non-Asian
Pac. LDCs 2,395 51.7 61,760 63.7 2,227 15.0





























































































Changes in Various GDP Ratios, I960- 1987
Ratios 1960 1970 1980 1985 1986 1987
Japan GDP over 
world GDP 3.7 8.0 10.6 12.3 15.0 15.6
Asian-Pacific GDP 
over world GDP 7.8 11.5 15.5 17.7 19.7 20.0
Pacific Basin GDP 
over world GDP 16.2 20.0 21.6 25.2 26.4 26.1
Pacific Basin GDP 
over Atlantic 
Basin GDP 38.5 45.9 49.4 65.3 65.9 62.9
Asian-Pacific GDP 
over U.S. GDP 18.0 29.7 58.4 48.3 61.4 67.8
Asian-Pacific GDP 
over European GDP 27.5 37.4 43.9 67.7 68.0 63.7





























































































Changes in Asian-Pacific Trade Flow Ratios, 1960- 1988, Per cent
Ratios 1960 1970 1980 1985 1987 1988
Trade of Asian-Pacific 
LDCs over trade of 
the other LDCs 21.7 30.0 28.8 42.6 57.7 59.5
Manufactured exports 
of Asian-Pacific LDCs 
over total manufac. 
exports of all LDCs 30.9 41.6 64.3 72.9 74.2 n. a.
Manufactured exports of 
Asian-Pacific NIEs over 
total manufactured 
exports of all LDCs 24.2 36.2 56.2 64.7 66.8 n. a .




























































































Imports to the Asian-Pacific Region from Principal Countries and 
Country Groups, 1960-1988
Table 5
Country 1960 1970 1980 1985 1987 1988
(U.S.$ Billions)
United States 2.9 9.4 51.9 56.5 70.8 98.0
Canada 0.4 1.3 6.8 7.2 9.5 12.8
Europe (OECD) 2.9 6.8 33.4 41.1 64.1 82.6
Sweden
Non-Asian-Pacific
0.08 0.2 1.6 1.9 2.5 3.1
LDCs (excl China) 1.7 6.6 90.0 53.1 39.8 62.9
China 0.4 1.0 10.8 17.7 25.8 34.1
USSR, Eastern Europe 0.1 0.9 3.0 2.0 3.5 4.5
Asian-Pacific countries 3.6 12.2 87.7 114.9 155.7 196.8
TOTAL 12.0 38.2 283.6 305.6 369.2 491.7
(Per cent of total Asian-Pacific imports)
Unites States 22.5 24.1 17.5 18.5 18.3 19.8
Canada 2.8 3.3 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6
Europe (OECD) 22.1 17.6 11.3 13.4 16.6 16.7
Sweden 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Non-Asian-Pacific
LDCs (excl China) 12.9 17.1 30.4 17.0 10.3 12.7
China 2.8 2.6 3.6 5.8 6.6 6.9
USSR, Eastern Europe 1.1 2.3 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.9
Asian-Pacific countries 28.4 31.6 29.6 37.6 40.3 39.8
TOTAL 92.6 98.6 95.7 95.4 95.5 99.4




























































































Exports to the Asian-Pacific Region as a Percentage of the Total 
Exports of Each Exporting Country or Country Group, 1960-1988. 
Per cent
Country 1960 1970 1980 1985 1987 1988
United States 13.1 19.2 21.2 22.7 25.7 27.4
Canada 6.6 6.8 8.6 7.2 8.8 9.8
Europe (OECD) 5.8 4.6 3.7 4.6 5.2 5.6Sweden 3.0 3.0 4.8 5.8 5.1 5.5
Europe (OECD) 
excl intra-
European trade 13.4 13.6 11.4 12.7 17.2 19.0
Sweden excl 
intra-Euro-
pean trade 10.7 11.6 16.9 18.4 18.4 19.7
Non-Asian-Pacific
LDCs (excl China) 6.5 12.5 15.8 13.4 9.2 9.4
China 19.5 54.1 54.2 59.5 57.8 61.9
USSR,
Eastern Europe 3.3 9.9 5.1 4.0 6.0 7.0
Sources: See Table 4.
Appendix to Table 6
Share of exports of European countries to Asia-Pacific in 1988
Country Per cent Country Per cent































































































Principal countries and Country Groups Importing from the Asian- 
Pacific Region, 1960-1988
Table 7





9.7 66.1 126.5 162.7 178.6
Canada 0.2 0.9 4.6 8.1 10.8 13.7
Europe (OECD) 3.3 6.8 52.3 52.1 98.3 117.9
Sweden 0.1 0.2 1.4 2.1 3.9 4.7
Non-Asian-Pacific 
LDCs (excl China) 1.9 4.6 42.6 38.3 32.9 58.2
China 0.1 0.8 7.6 22.4 22.1 27.6
USSR, Eastern Europe 0.4 0.9 7.6 5.9 5.1 6.4
(Imports from Asia-■Pacific as a percentage of total)
Unites States 15.3 22.8 25.7 35.0 38.4 38.8
Canada 3.7 6.7 7.5 10.3 12.0 12.6
Europe (OECD) 5.8 4.6 5.8 6.6 8.6 9.2
Sweden 2.8 2.9 4.2 5.7 9.7 10.4
Non-Asian-Pacific 
LDCs (excl China) 7.8 11.0 10.4 11.2 8.5 13.4
China 4.7 4.4 39.0 52.5 51.2 49.9
USSR, Eastern Europe 2.7 8.6 11.7 9.6 7.9 8.6
































































































Total Textiles, Electrical Radio,
manufacturing clothing, machines TV
leather, and
footwear appliances
1970 1985 1970 1985 1970 1985 1970 1985
Germany, 
Fed.Rep. 0.38 1.40 1.33 7.96 0.04 1.32 0.38 5.36
France 0.15 0.79 0.11 2.08 0.01 0.73 0.06 2.39
United Kingdom 0.41 1.42 2.10 7.74 0.14 1.15 0.37 4.11
Italy 0.27 0.91 0.34 1.18 0.07 0.52 0.40 3.91
Sweden 0.65 1.80 4.03 18.72 0.02 1.09 0.20 5.31
United States 0.49 2.41 1.53 11.16 0.44 5.93 1.55 7.54
Canada 0.43 1.98 2.08 9.99 0.08 2.23 0.90 11.82
Japan 0.30 0.85 1.17 3.82 0.10 0.73 0.19 0.68





























































































(Exports of the U.S., EC and Sweden to a number of East 
Asian countries and country groups in pro mille of GDP of 
the U.S., EC, Sweden, and Japan, respectively)
Table 9
Export Intensities
Country 1970 1975 1980 1987
Japan
U.S. 4.61 6.05 7.74 6.33
EC 2.08 1.94 2.14 3.67
Sweden 1.98 2.14 2.85 4.07
South Korea
U.S. 0.63 1.11 1.74 1.81
EC 0.22 0.40 0.43 0.98
Sweden 0.06 0.10 0.34 0.97
Japan 4.01 4.49 5.09 5.62
Taiwan
U.S. 0.36 1.04 1.74 1.70
EC 0.19 0.45 0.51 0.99
Sweden 0.12 0.29 0.51 1.39
Japan 3.21 3.60 5.03 5.00
Asian NIEs 
U.S.
(SK, T, HK, 
1.63
S) 3.29 5.62 5.32
EC 1.67 2.02 2.70 4.12
Sweden 0.78 1.04 3.44 4.92
Japan 12.60 13.89 18.35 16.94
Thailand
U.S. 0.15 0.23 0.47 0.35
EC 0.37 0.29 0.33 0.44
Sweden 0.27 0.25 0.69 0.52
Japan 2.20 1.92 1.82 1.26
ASEAN
U.S. 1.08 2.14 3.42 2.21
EC 1.87 2.17 2.41 2.30
Sweden 1.32 1.96 4.89 3.25
Japan 8.88 11.85 12.36 6.61
Sources: Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF; International 
Financial Statistics, IMF; World Tables 1988/89, World Bank; 
Inspectorate General of Customs, Taipei; Taiwanese exchange rates 




























































































Exports of the U.S., EC and Sweden to a number of East 
Asian countries and country groups in per cent of total 
export of the U.S., EC, Sweden, and Japan, respectively. 




Country 1970 1975 1980 1987
Japan
U.S. 10.76 8.89 9.42 11.17
EC 3.47 2.54 2.87 5.38
Sweden 3.79 2.91 4.00 5.17
South Korea
U.S. 1.47 1.64 2.12 3.20
EC 0.38 0.52 0.58 1.44
Sweden 0.11 0.13 0.47 1.23
Japan 4.23 4.03 4.13 5.77
Taiwan
U.S. 0.84 1.52 2.11 3.00
EC 0.31 0.59 0.69 1.46
Sweden 0.23 0.39 0.71 1.76
Japan 3.39 3.22 4.09 5.12
Asian NIEs (SK, 
U.S.
T, HK, S) 
3.81 4.83 6.82 9.38
EC 2.79 2.65 3.62 6.03
Sweden 1.49 1.41 4.83 6.24
Japan 13.29 12.46 14.90 17.38
Thailand
U.S. 0.35 0.33 0.57 0.61
EC 0.61 0.38 0.44 0.65
Sweden 0.52 0.34 0.97 0.66
Japan 2.32 1.72 1.48 1.29
ASEAN
U.S. 2.54 3.14 4.15 3.90
EC 3.13 2.84 3.24 3.37
Sweden 2.52 2.66 6.86 4.12
Japan 9.36 10.62 10.03 6.78




























































































Exports of manufactures (SITC groups 5-8) of the U.S. and EC to 
Japan in per cent of GDP/total exports/total exports of 
manufactures/total exports to Japan. For EC internal trade 
excluded. (In parentheses excluded.)
Table 11
Export Intensities of M a nufactures
1970 1980 1985
U.S.
Share of GDP 0.193 0.320 0.281
Share of total export 4.5 3.9 5.2
Share of total exports
of manufactures 6.6 6.0 7.7
Share of total exports
to Japan 42 42 52
EC
Share of GDP 0.186 0.184 0.266
Share of total export 
(Incl. internal trade) 1.00 0.77 0.96
Share of total export
(excl. internal trade) n. a. 1.8 2.0
(excl. western 
European trade) 2.9 2.4 2.7
Share of total exports 
of manufactures 
(incl. internal trade) 1.3 1.1 1.3
Share of total exports 
of manufactures 
(excl. internal trade) 2.6 2.1 2.6
Share of total exports
to Japan 87 84 82
Sources: International Trade Statistics Yearbook (Vol I), 1983, 
1987, UN; Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF; International 




























































































(Imports from an East Asian country into the U.S., EC, Sweden, 
and Japan as pro mille of GNP of importing country)
Table 12
Import Intensities
Country 1970 1975 1980 1987
Japan
U.S. 6.2 7.8 12.3 16.0
EC 3.0 6.5 6.3 9.8
Sweden 3.8 6.9 7.7 15.1
South Korea
U.S. 0.39 1.00 1.65 4.03
EC 0.09 0.72 0.93 1.66
Sweden 0.39 0.69 1.23 2.32
Japan 1.12 2.62 2.87 3.44
Taiwan
U.S. 0.56 1.15 2.51 5.30
EC 0.21 0.71 0.91 1.62
Sweden 0.12 0.30 0.77 1.84
Japan 1.06 1.38 2.00 2.92
Asian NIEs (SK, T, 
U.S.
HK, S) 
2.0 3.6 6.8 13.1
EC 1.4 3.6 4.2 5.7
Sweden 2.1 2.9 4.4 6.9
Japan 3.1 5.3 6.9 7.9
Thailand
U.S. 0.11 0.15 0.32 0.54
EC 0.22 0.40 0.57 0.67
Sweden 0.06 0.18 0.24 0.45
Japan 0.93 1.45 1.06 0.76
ASEAN
U.S. 1.0 2.5 4.8 4.0
EC 1.6 2.7 3.0 2.8
Sweden 0.9 1.1 1.8 1.8
Japan 9.1 12.7 20.1 7.8
Sources: Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF; International
Financial Statistics, IMF; World Tables 1988/89, World Bank;





























































































The EC's External Trade
Table 13
Countries External trade Share of total external
millions U.S..$ trade, per cent
1982 1987 1988 1982 1987 1988
U.S./Canada 111 168 186 18 21 21
EFT A 116 200 221 19 25 25
Japan 26 58 70 4 7 8
Asian NIEs 19 43 53 2 5 6
ASEAN 12 16 19 2 2 2
China 5 12 15 1 2 2
Other 322 303 327 53 38 37
Internal trade 660 1114 1260 108 139 142

































































































Direct Investment in 
Country (million U.S.
Japan and the 
■$)
U.S. ,






























































































































































Stock of Foreign Direct Investment in U.S.A., West Germany, U.K.
Table 15
Thailand, and Japan, as Reported by Host Country (million U.S.$)
Country 1971 1981 1983 1984 1986
U.S.A
from WE 10,337 72,264 92,874 108,115 141,547
Jap -227 7.697 11,336 16,044 23,433
West Germany 
from WE n.a. 16,224 15,178 14,566 14,647 (1985)
U.S. n. a. 13,581 13,333 11,895 11,578 (1985)
Jap n.a. 1,276 1,368 1,521 1,797 (1985)
U.K
from WE 3,521 13,345 n.a. 4,871 n.a
U.S. 1,935 16,181 n.a. 35,179 n.a
Jap 39 380 n.a. 841 n. a
Japan
from WE 151 842 1,039 1,180 1,637
U.S. 572 1,761 2,441 2,655 3,407
Thailand
1970 1975 1980 1987
from EC 4 64 157 383
Sweden 0.2 0.9 1.3 10.7
U.S. 17 202 324 792
Japan 16 138 287 824
Sources: International Financial Statistics, IMF; UNCTC, 1988; 






























































































Country Average Annual Growth Rate (per cent) Unemployment
GDP Industry (per cent of
labour force)
1965-80 1980-86 1965-80 1980-86 1987
Germany, 
Fed.Rep. 3.3 1.5 2.9 0.7 7.9
France 4.4 1.3 4.6 0.6 10.5
Netherlands 3.7 1.0 3.6 0.5 12.6
Belgium 3.9 0.9 4.4 0.5 11.2
United Kingdom 2.2 2.3 1.2 2.0 10.3
Italy 3.9 1.3 4.2 0.2 11.0
United States 2.8 3.1 1.9 3.2 6.2
Japan 6.3 3.7 8.5 5.0 2.8
Sweden 2.8 2.0 2.2 2.5 1.9
Korea, Rep.of 9.5 8.2 16.5 10.2 -
Thailand 7.4 4.8 9.5 5.0
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The Geographical Distribution of the Japanese Direct Investment 
Stock in Europe, 1970-1987
Table 18
Countries Share of Japan's direct investment stock in Europe
1970 1980 1987
Value Per cent Value Per cent Value Per cent
(U.S.$) (U.S.$) (U.S.$)
Belgium 20 3.1 291 6.5 863 4.1
France 22 3.4 354 7.9 1,300 6.2
West Germany 16 2.5 498 11.1 1,935 9.3
Luxembourg 8 1.3 105 2.3 4,072 19.3
Netherlands 3 0.5 298 6.6 3,166 15.0
Spain 4 0.6 173 3.9 883 4.2
U.K. 544 85.1 2,010 44.9 6,598 31.3
Other EC ii 1.8 304 6.8 845 4.0
Total EC 12 628 98.3 4,033 90.2 19,682 93.5
Total Europe 639 100.0 4,472 100.0 21,047 100.0




























































































Exports from the Asian-Pacific Region to Principal Importing 
countries and Country Groups as a Percentage of Total Asian- 
Pacific Exports, 1960-1988. Per cent
Table 19






























LDCs (excl China) 16.3 12.0 16.2 11.6 9.6 10.0
China 0.8 2.1 2.8 6.1 4.6 5.1
USSR,
Eastern Europe 2.6 2.2 2.4 1.4 0.9 0.9
Asian-Pacific
Countries 26.5 32.5 36.2 30.5 31.2 33.5
TOTAL 91.2 95.9 98.2 94.9 99.1 99.9
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